An evaluation of the effectiveness of the application of section 42 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 by Max, Lennit Hendry
1 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
 
 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION OF 
SECTION 42 OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998 
 
 
By 
 
 
LENNIT HENDRY MAX 
 
    Student number: 3110656 
 
 
A mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
Magister Legum (Labour Law) 
 
in the Faculty of Law 
of the University of the Western Cape. 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Mr Pieter Koornhof                                Date:  12 November 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Contents page                2      
 
Declaration                 5 
 
Keywords                 6 
 
Dedication                 7 
 
Acknowledgements                7 
 
Abbreviations                                                                                                                   8 
 
Abstract                            9 
 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study                                                                10                                                         
1.2 Rationale and Significance of the Study                                                                    12 
1.3 Aims of the research              15 
1.4 Research question               15  
1.5 Research methodology                                                                                               16    
1.6 Chapter structure                                                                                                        16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Chapter 2 – Overview of Affirmative Action in a South African Context 
2.1 Introduction 17  
2.2 Affirmative Action             17 
2.2.1 Employment Equity                                                                                                19 
2.2.2 Formal and Substantive Equality                                                                            22 
2.2.3 Suitably Qualified                                                                                                   26  
2.2.4 Right of Designated Employee to be Appointed of Promoted                               27 
2.2.5 Citizenship                                                                                                              29 
2.2.6 Differentiation              31  
2.3 Operational Requirements            37  
2.4 Conclusion              37  
 
Chapter 3 - A Comparative Analysis of The Law of Affirmative Action in the United 
                     States of America, Namibia and International Law in relation to South 
                     Africa’s Constitution and Employment Equity Act 
 
3 The United States of America            39  
3.1 Introduction              39  
3.2 Affirmative Action in the US            40  
3.3 Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action           44  
3.4 Conclusion              50  
 
3.5 Affirmative Action in Namibia            50  
3.5.1 Introduction              50  
3.5.2 Comparison of Legislation            51 
3.5.3 Definitions              54  
3.5.4 Conclusion              58 
 
3.6 International Law              58 
3.6.1 Introduction              58 
3.6.2 The UN Charter              59 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
3.6.3 The Race Convention             60 
3.6.4 The Women Convention            62 
3.6.5 The International Labour Organization           63 
3.7 Conclusion              65 
 
Chapter 4 - The obligation of Employers to ensure systems are in place to eliminate 
                      Unfair Discrimination in the workplace, and an evaluation of the 
                      powers of the Director-General of Labour in terms of compliance with 
                      the Public Administrative Justice Act   
 
4.1 Introduction              67 
4.2 Monitoring and Enforcement Legislation           67  
4.3 Duties of Employers             70 
4.3.1 Consultation with Employers            71 
4.3.2 Affirmative Action Plans            72 
4.3.3 The Monitoring of the Implementation of Affirmative Action        73 
4.4 Conclusion              74  
 
4.5 Powers of the Director-General of Labour          75 
4.6 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)         76  
4.6.1 Judicial review of Administrative Action          79 
4.7 Conclusion              79 
 
Chapter 5 - An Evaluation of whether Section 42 of the Employment Equity Act and 
                     the powers of the Director-General of Labour are sufficient to ensure 
                     equal representation of disadvantaged groups in the workplace  
 
5.1 Introduction              81  
5.2 Discussion               81 
5.3 Conclusion              84 
5.4 Recommendation              85 
Bibliography               87 
            
                               
 
 
 
 
5 
 
            
                         
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
I, LENNIT HENDRY MAX, declare that an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
application of section 42 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 is my own work. It 
has never been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university. 
All the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as 
complete references. 
 
 
Signed …………............. 
Date:  12 November 2012 
Student Number: 3110656 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
Affirmative action 
Apartheid 
Constitution 
Designated 
Differentiation 
Dignity 
Disadvantaged 
Discrimination 
Equality 
Formal 
Substantive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
This work is dedicated to my late parents, Jan Max (father), Lettie Max (mother), my 
wife, Farouz Max and my son, Lennit Hendry Max (Jnr). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I acknowledge with great thanks and gratitude the assistance of the following persons: 
Mr Pieter Koornhof (my Supervisor),  Professor I Leeman, Farouz (my wife), Lennit (my 
son), Adv Sharon Loops, Dr Dion George MP, Ds Alwyn Carstens, Ms Ronnel Ochse, 
Mr S Tarkey (UWC Library),  Mr I Paleker (UWC Library). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ANC  -       African National Congress 
BBBEE  -   Broad Based Black Economical Empowerment 
CC  -           Constitutional Court 
CEE  -         Commission for Employment Equity 
EEA  -         Employment Equity Act 
EEC  -         Employment Equity Commission 
EO  -           Executive Order 
GN  -           Government Notice 
ICCPR  -     International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR  -   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ILO  -          International Labour Organization 
LAC  -         Labour Appeal Court 
LRA  -         Labour Relations Act 
OFCCP  -    Office of Contract Compliance Programs 
PAJA  -       Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
PEPUDA -  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
UN  -           United Nations 
US  -            United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper evaluates s 42 of the South African Employment Equity Act (EEA) with 
specific focus on the application of the demographic profile of the national and regional 
economically active population by designated employers. The comparative analysis 
considers how the law of affirmative action in the United States of America and in 
Namibia, international conventions and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 
relation to South Africa’s Constitution and the EEA promote affirmative action. While 
international law holds that affirmative action measures should be of a temporary nature 
with an individualistic focus on formal equity, the EEA granted affirmative action 
measures which are permanent, group based and substantive in nature. 
 
Given South Africa`s discriminatory past, it became an accepted principle that 
affirmative action needs to be implemented to redress the imbalances caused by 
apartheid. In broad terms, the EEA provides for the advantage of persons or certain 
categories of persons who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. As a result the 
EEA focuses on race, sex and people with disabilities to determine those who are to be 
the beneficiaries of affirmative action.  
 
International Law also embraces the notion of affirmative action and place a duty on all 
member states to act pro-actively to correct the effects of unfair discrimination. The mini-
thesis also evaluates the powers of the Director-General of Labour with specific focus on 
the enforcement of measures and how it relates to the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA) in compliance with the provisions of the EEA.  
 
It is concluded that s 42 of the EEA (with the exception of s 42(a)(i)) provides sufficient 
measures to redress the inequalities of the past by providing equal opportunities for 
suitably qualified people of the designated groups. That the Constitution and the EEA 
does not provide for differentiation amongst “Black people” (African, Coloureds and 
Indians). That the application of both the national and regional demographics are 
compulsory in formulating an equity plan, that the one cannot be ignored in favour of the 
other, and that the Director-General of Labour is sufficiently empowered to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of the EEA. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study  
 
The Preamble to the South African Constitution recognises the injustices of South 
Africa’s past.1 The differentiation made between race groups was central to the divisions 
which existed and to a large extent still exist in South Africa, and is furthermore a source 
of grave assaults on the dignity of its people, in particular black people.
2
  
 
Mahomed J commented as follows: ‘The past was redolent with statutes which assaulted 
the human dignity of persons on the grounds of race and colour alone.’3 This 
discrimination has, among other things, resulted in the fact that those who were not white 
were traditionally employed in inferior positions.
4
 In South Africa this differentiation was 
prevalent in all spheres of society, ‘it determined  people’s voting rights, where they 
could reside, where they could own property, their social status, the jobs for which they 
could apply, the amount of their pension and the quality of their children’s education’.5 
The aforementioned discrimination had the effect that non-whites were disadvantaged at 
all levels of society. Hence affirmative action measures were designed to eradicate these 
iniquitous practices.  
 
The concept of affirmative action has its origin in the United States of America where it 
resulted from various forms of mass action by the Civil Rights Movement against racial 
inequalities during the 1950’s and 1960’s.6 Namibia also perceived affirmative action as 
a necessary tool to bring about change in a previous discriminatory society created by the 
former South African Government.
7
 During the transition period from apartheid to South 
Africa`s new democracy, political leaders negotiated the interim Constitution
8
 followed 
by the final Constitution. The interim as well as the final Constitutions were written with 
equality at the centre.
9
 The Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa and any law 
inconsistent with it is invalid. 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 
2 Ngcukaitobi T ‘Adjudicating Transformation in the Labour Courts – An edifice on the rise?’ (2007) 28 
  ILJ 1. 
3 S v Makwanyane & Another (1995) 3 SA 262 (CC).  
4 Valentine S ‘An Appalling ‘science’’ Sunday Times 23 September 2007 6 ‘...They said the regulations    
   laid down that only Europeans could be on the artisan pay schedule. They said I could resign or to be 
   reduced to a Non – European grade.’ See also Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model 
   for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 74. ‘The system of apartheid systemically discriminated against black 
   people in all aspects of social life. Senior jobs and access to established schools and Universities were 
   denied to them.’ 
5 Valentine S ‘An Appalling ‘science’’ Sunday Times 23 September 2007 6. 
6 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 9.  
7 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 16. 
8 Act 127 of 1993 (hereafter the interim Constitution). 
9 Gaibie S ‘Employment Equity and Anti-Discrimination Law: The Employment Equity Act 12 years on’ 
  (2011) 1 ILJ 19. See also Ngcukaitobi T ‘Adjudicating Transformation in the Labour Courts – An edifice 
  on the rise?’ (2007)  28 ILJ 3. 
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Section 9 of the Bill of Rights
10
deals with the prohibition of unfair discrimination. It 
follows that at the heart of this prohibition lies the recognition that the Constitution’s sole 
objective is to ensure that all people are equal regardless of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and political opinion.
11
 It implies that the aim is to empower the disadvantaged 
groups to compete equally in the workplace with those who were advantaged during 
apartheid. In terms of s 9(4), national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination. Hence the constitutional jurisprudence emphasizes the fact that 
equality is only possible if equality is given a substantive rather than a formal meaning.
12
  
A formal approach to equality will only ensure that people are being treated the same but 
imbalances will still exist.
13
  
 
Therefore, substantive equality will ensure that the systemic inequality which exists on 
the basis of race, gender and other grounds is addressed and eradicated.
14
 In its attempt to 
address these inequalities in the workplace, government promulgated the Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA). Section 2 defines the purpose of the EEA and state: 
 
‘The purpose of this Act is to achieve equity in the workplace by- 
(a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and 
(b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their 
equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce.’ 
 
Section 9(2) of the Constitution sanctions measures, such as affirmative action, as a form 
of ‘fair discrimination’ to ensure that processes are developed to address the imbalances 
of the past. Accordingly, the EEA recognizes that, as a result of apartheid and other 
discriminatory laws and practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation and 
income in the national labour market, and that these disparities caused severe 
disadvantages to certain groups and need to be corrected.
15
 Ngobo J concluded in Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others as follows:  
 
‘Our constitution recognises that decades of systemic racial discrimination 
 entrenched by apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action 
 being taken to achieve that result. We are required to do more than that. The 
 effects of discrimination may continue indefinitely unless there is a commitment 
 to end it.’16 
 
                                                 
10 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
11 Section 15(1) of the Constitution. 
12 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 8131. 
13 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 8131. 
14 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 8131. 
15 Preamble to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA). 
16 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 74. 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Dupper also has the following view: ‘Substantive equality takes the circumstances of 
people into account and requires the law to ensure equality of outcome.’17 
 
1.2 Rationale and Significance of the study 
 
The EEA places an obligation on designated employers to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of the Act. In terms of s 43, the Director-General of Labour has the power to 
conduct a review in order to assess an employer’s compliance with s 42 of the Act, and 
may refer the employer’s non-compliance to the Labour Court. Section 42 of the EEA 
laid down the test for assessment of compliance which the Director-General should use.  
 
The current provision states: 
 
‘In determining whether a designated employer is implementing employment equity 
in compliance with this Act, the Director-General or any person or body applying 
this Act must, in addition to the factors stated in s 15, take into account all of the 
following: 
(a)   The extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different 
        designated groups are equitably represented within each occupational         
        category and level in that employer's workforce in relation to the- 
(i) demographic profile of the national and regional economically active 
    population; 
(ii)  pool of suitably qualified people from designated groups from which the 
      employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint employees; 
(iii) economic and financial factors relevant to the sector in which the 
      employer operates; 
(iv) present and anticipated economic and financial circumstances of the 
      employer; and 
(v)  the number of present and planned vacancies that exist in the various 
      categories and levels, and the employer's labour turnover; 
(b)   progress made in implementing employment equity by other designated 
        employers operating under comparable circumstances and within the same 
       sector; 
 (c)  reasonable efforts made by a designated employer to implement 
       its employment equity plan; 
 (d)  the extent to which the designated employer has made progress 
       in eliminating employment barriers that adversely affect people from 
       designated groups; and 
 (e) any other prescribed factor’. (own emphasis) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
Dupper O ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African Experience’ 14 ed (2002) SA 
    Merc LJ 275. 
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Section 42 of the EEA as indicated above deals with compliance with the provisions of 
the Act to ensure that the inequalities of the past are being eliminated. Section 43 of the 
EEA, as indicated before, empowers the Director-General to conduct a review to ensure 
compliance with the Act by designated employers and it states:  
 
‘(1) The Director-General may conduct a review to determine whether an employer is 
       complying with this Act. 
(2) In order to conduct the review the Director-General may – 
(a) request an employer to submit to the Director-General a copy of its 
current analysis or employment equity plan; 
(b) request an employer to submit to the Director-General any book, record, 
correspondence, document or information that could reasonably be 
relevant to the review of the employer`s compliance with this Act; 
(c) request a meeting with an employer to discuss its employment equity 
plan, the implementation of its plan and any matters related to its 
compliance with this Act; or 
(d) request a meeting with any – 
(i) employee or trade union consulted in terms of section 16; 
(ii) workplace forum; or 
(iii) other person who may have information relevant to the review.' 
 
It can be presumed that the Director-General, as a public figure and before applying s 
45 of the EEA, has to comply with s 2(b) of The Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act (PAJA).
18
 Recently, amendments to, inter alia, s 42 of the EEA have been 
proposed.
19
  These proposed amendments to s 42, it is submitted, imply (directly or 
indirectly) that the current s 42 does not give sufficient effect to the objectives of 
affirmative action.   
 
These intended amendments seek to remove the reference to “national and regional” 
demographics in s 42(a)(i), while completely removing ss 42(a)(ii) to 42(a)(v). 
However, these proposed amendments have met with some controversy in light of the 
reactions to comments made by the former Director-General, Jimmy Manyi.
20
 As a 
result of public outcry it is highly likely that the government will not pursue 
implementing these proposals. The International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention) provides for ‘proactive measures’ 
against racism.
21
  
                                                 
18 Act No. 3 of 2000 Subsection 2(b) states: ‘In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair 
     administrative action, an administrator, subjected to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in 
     subsection (1)- (a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action; 
     (b) a action; (d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and (e) 
     adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.’ 
19  Employment Equity Bill (B -2010). 
20  Hlongwane S (Analysis): ‘Jimmy Manyi finds out just how tough it is to be between Manuel and  a hard 
     place’ The Daily Maverick  2 March 2011 5 as well as Graham S ‘Manyi Coloured remarks cast          
     doubt on  job suitability’ The Citizen  2 March 2011 6. 
21  Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation No.111 of 
     the International Labour Organisation, 1958. 
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This positive notion implies that the State must not wait until somebody complains 
about discrimination.
22
 According to the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC), the South African government report on compliance with the Convention 
indicates that a framework is in place to eliminate discrimination, and addresses the 
South African concept of unfair discrimination, the approach of the courts, and 
protection of non-citizens from racial discrimination, and special measures to advance 
certain categories of persons.
23
 
 
In this regard, s 9 of the Constitution and Chapter II of the EEA are in place to ensure 
compliance therewith. In addition to the aforesaid, the Constitutional Court (CC) (as the 
final arbitrator) was created to enforce the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
24
 It 
should also be borne in mind that any decision made in terms of the relevant EEA 
sections should also be in line with the principles and provisions of the PAJA.  
 
The court in Dudley v City of Cape Town & Another,
25
 concluded that Chapter V of the 
EEA deals with the enforcement of the provisions stipulated in Chapter III (affirmative 
action) and that Chapter V is the most suitable remedy to ensure compliance therewith. 
The effect of the court decision, it is submitted, is that the first step to ensure 
compliance with Chapter III is to invoke the remedies contained in Chapter V.  
 
Ngcukaitobi
26
 argues that s 15 of the EEA demands affirmative action measures to be 
designed to ensure that ‘suitably qualified’ people from designated groups (Africans, 
coloureds, Indians, women and people with disabilities) have ‘equal employment’ 
opportunities and are ‘equitably represented’ in ‘all’ occupational categories and levels in 
the workplace of a designated employer. Cooper
27
 is of the view that an employee would 
suffer indirect discrimination when criteria, conditions or policies are applied which 
appear to be neutral but which adversely affect a disproportionate number of a certain 
group.  
 
The assessment of s 42 against these arguments is critical to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution and the EEA, and whether the latter addresses equitable representation of 
disadvantaged people in the workplace. It is submitted that an evaluation of the current s 
42 and the powers of the Director-General of Labour is essential to answer the question 
as to whether the EEA addresses the objectives of affirmative action adequately or not. 
Application and enforcement of s 42 should accordingly be measured in light of South 
Africa’s obligations in terms of the Constitution, the goals of the EEA, as well as against 
the definitions of discrimination in terms of the ILO (International Labour Organization) 
Convention 111 of 1958.  
 
                                                 
22  Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 74. 
23  South African Human Rights Commission ‘Shadow Report on the South Africa`s compliance with the     
     Provisions of the International Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ (2006) 15. 
24 Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 74. 
25 (2008) 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC). 
26 Ngcukaitobi T ‘Adjudicating Transformation in the Labour Courts - An Edifice on the Rice?’ (2007) 28 
    ILJ 1436. 
27 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 813. 
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For the purpose of legal comparison, international and foreign law on affirmative action 
and policy will also be analysed in order to gain a global perspective. In this instance 
similarities as well as differences exist between South Africa, the United States and 
Namibia given their historical backgrounds.
28
 As Wing states: “the equity clause of the 
South African Constitution is very detailed in comparison to the US Fourteenth 
Amendment, encompassing equal protection, anti-discrimination, affirmative action, and 
private action notions.”29  
 
The South African Constitution also goes beyond the individualistic approach of the 
United States (US).
30
 Strong parallels exist between the South African EEA and the 
Namibian Affirmative Action (Employment) Act 29 of 1998. The Constitution requires 
that, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court must consider international law and may 
consider foreign law.
31
 Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate and compare foreign law 
and the enforcement mechanisms which the US and Namibia use to ensure compliance 
with their affirmative action and anti-discrimination laws as well as their compliance with 
the United Nations (UN) and ILO Conventions.  
 
 
1.3 Aims of the research 
 
The principal objective of this research will be to evaluate if the application of s 42 of the 
EEA, the Constitution, and the powers vested in the Director-General of Labour are 
sufficient to ensure adequate representation in the workplace. The objective of 
affirmative action is to ensure equitable representation of disadvantaged groups in the 
workplace. Section 42 determines that the demographic profile of the national and 
regional economically active population should be taken into account in addressing 
representation.  
 
This research will evaluate the operation of s 42, and the powers of the Director-General 
of Labour against the provisions of the Constitution, relevant statutes, South Africa’s 
international legal obligations as well as case law to determine whether these laws 
contributed sufficiently to the representation of the different designated groupings in the 
workplace. 
 
 
1.4 Research question 
 
Whether the application of s 42 of the EEA, the Constitution, and the powers vested in 
the Director-General of Labour is sufficient to ensure adequate representation in the 
workplace. 
 
                                                 
28 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 10. 
29 Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 74. 
30 Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 74. 
31 Sections 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
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1.5 Research methodology 
 
The literature study will include both primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources will essentially consist of the Constitution of South Africa, foreign law, 
international conventions, a comparative study of the United States and Namibian 
legislation, as well as South African case law and legislation. The secondary sources 
include, inter alia, textbooks, journal articles, internet sources, media reports and 
statistics.  
 
 
1.6 Chapter structure 
 
Chapter 1 consists of the background to the study, the rationale for and significance of the 
study, the research question, and, research methodology. 
 
Chapter 2 deals with two concepts e.g. affirmative action in South Africa and a brief 
discussion of inherent requirements which justify fair discrimination. This chapter will 
commence with an overview of the relevant principles of these two concepts as contained 
in legislation and case law. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a comparative analysis of foreign law and international conventions 
regarding the relationship between affirmative action and non-discrimination, evaluates 
the Constitution and the EEA against the former, and considers how these legal principles 
relate to the South African context.   
 
Chapter 4 addresses the issues surrounding the elimination of unfair discrimination, 
enforcement mechanisms, and the obligation of employers to ensure that systems are in 
place to deal effectively with equity in the workplace. This chapter will also evaluate the 
powers of the Director-General of Labour and the principles of PAJA in ensuring 
compliance with the Act.  
 
Chapter 5 which is the concluding chapter evaluates whether s 42 of the EEA and the 
powers of the Director-General of Labour are sufficient to ensure equal representation of 
disadvantage groups in the workplace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Given South Africa`s history during apartheid, discrimination in the workplace was 
legally enforced on the basis of race and gender.
32
 As a result employers had a free hand 
to discriminate on the basis of religion, disability and political opinion.
33
 This led to racist 
and sexist practices which resulted in systemic and institutional discrimination and 
inequality.
34
 
 
The Constitution and the EEA were enacted. They acknowledge the injustices of the past, 
provide measures to eliminate unfair labour practices in the workplace, and contain an 
express prohibition of direct and indirect unfair discrimination.
35
 Thus s 6(2) of the EEA 
states: 
 
‘It is not unfair discrimination to- 
(a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or 
(b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent 
requirement of a job.’ 
 
 
2.2 Affirmative Action  
 
The Constitution recognizes the injustices of the past and identifies the need to ensure a 
society based on equality, dignity and freedom.
36
 Further, the Constitution created the 
basis for affirmative action and states as follows: 
 
‘Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
  freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
 other measures designed  to protect or advance persons or categories 
 of persons, disadvantaged by  unfair discrimination may be taken.’ 37 
 
                                                 
32 Valentine S ‘An Appalling ‘science’’ Sunday Times 23 September 2007 6. 
33 Du Toit D ‘Labour Law from a working class perspective: Protection against Unfair Discrimination in 
    the Workplace: Are the Courts getting it Right’? (2007) 1. 
34 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law (2006) 390. 
35 Apon L ‘et al’  ‘Does a right to be appointed exist for designated groups? The boundaries of 
    employment equity’ (2010) 346. 
36 Preamble of Constitution.  
37 Section.9(2) of the Constitution.  
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It is evident that s 9(2) creates a broad category of beneficiaries of affirmative action. 
Although the Constitution did not define ‘disadvantaged persons’ per se, that function is 
delegated to be addressed in the legislation which it envisaged, namely the EEA.  
 
Subsequently the EEA was enacted to ensure compliance with s 9(2) of the Constitution 
in addressing the imbalances in the workplace. Chapter II of the Act provides for the 
elimination of unfair discrimination
38
 with a specific prohibition of direct and indirect 
unfair discrimination on specific grounds.
39
 Chapter III deals with affirmative action, and 
places an obligation on all designated employers
40
 to implement affirmative action 
measures to ensure representation in all categories and at all levels in the workplace.
41
 
 
The EEA, similarly to the Constitution, also recognizes the fact that apartheid 
disadvantaged certain categories of people. Hence the Preamble of the EEA states: 
 
‘Recognising – that as a result of apartheid and other discriminatory 
 laws and practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation 
 and income within the labour market; and that those disparities 
 create such pronounced disadvantages for certain categories of 
 people that they cannot be redressed simply by repealing 
 discriminatory laws, Therefore, in order to – promote the 
 constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true democracy; 
 eliminate unfair discrimination in employment; ensure the 
 implementation of employment equity to redress the effects of 
 discrimination; achieve a diverse workforce broadly representative of 
 our people; promote economic development and efficiency in the 
 workplace; and give effect to the obligations of the Republic as a 
 member of the International Labour Organisation.’ 
 
It can be concluded that s 2 of the EEA narrowed the scope of beneficiaries or categories 
of people by ring fencing the beneficiaries as ‘designated groups’.’ 
 
                                                 
38 EEA s 6(2) ‘It is not unfair discrimination to- (a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the 
     purpose of this Act; or (b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent 
     requirement of a job.’ 
39 EEA s 6(1) ‘No person may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or      
     more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
     sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.’ 
40 EEA s 1 ‘Designated employer means – (a) an employer who employs 50 or more employees;  (b) an 
     employer who employs fewer than 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or 
     above the applicable annual of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 to this Act; (c)  a municipality, 
     as referred to  in Chapter 7 of the Constitution; (d) an organ of state as defined in section 239 of the 
     Constitution, but excluding local spheres of government, the National  Defence Force, the National 
     Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Services; and (e) an employer bound by a collective 
     agreement in terms of section 23 or 31 of the Labour Relations Act, which appoints it as a designated 
     employer in terms of this Act, to the extent provided for in the agreement.’ 
41  EEA s 15(1). 
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Section 1 of the EEA defined ‘designated groups’ to mean Black people, women and 
people with disabilities. In terms of the EEA Black people are inclusive of Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians. 
 
Considering the restorative measure as contained in the EEA, it can thus be concluded 
that the apartheid system unfairly discriminated against Africans, Coloureds, Indians, 
women and people with disabilities. It is accordingly submitted that the EEA`s objective 
is to promote the constitutional right of equality and the achievement of a diverse and 
broadly representative workforce in South Africa.  
 
According to the Preamble of the EEA it is obvious that its purpose is twofold: first, to 
promote equal opportunities and fair treatment through the elimination of past unfair 
discrimination; secondly, to redress the past disadvantages to ensure equal representivity 
of ‘designated groups’ in the workplace by enforcing affirmative action measures.42 In 
this regard s 13 read alongside s 15 of the EEA places a legal obligation on designated 
employers to give effect to s 9(2) of the Constitution in implementing affirmative action 
measures for people in the designated groups in order to achieve employment equity.  
 
 
2.2.1 Employment Equity 
 
Although ‘employment equity’ is not defined in the EEA, s 15, directs employers on how 
to ensure the realization of affirmative action and states:  
 
‘(1) Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably 
       qualified people from designated groups have equal employment 
       opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories 
       and levels in the workforce of a designated employer, 
 
(2) Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer 
must include: (a) measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers, 
including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect people 
from designated groups; (b) measures designed to further diversity in the 
workplace based on equal dignity and respect of all people; (c) making 
reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups in order to      
ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably represented in 
the workforce of a designated employer; (d) … measures to: (i) ensure the 
equitable representation of suitably qualified people from designated groups 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; and (ii) retain and 
develop people from designated groups and to implement appropriate 
training measures, including measures in terms of an Act of Parliament 
providing for skills development.  
 
                                                 
42 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law’ (2006) 39. 
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(3) The measures referred to in subsection (2)(d) include preferential treatment 
       and numerical goals, but exclude quotas. 
 
(4) Subject to section 42, nothing in this section requires a designated employer to 
      take any decision concerning an employment policy or practice that would 
      establish an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or 
      advancement of people who are not from the designated groups.’ 
 
Therefore, the inference to be drawn is that equality is a value and affirmative action a 
measure.
43
 It follows that the two are not the same. Equity as a value is clearly illustrated 
in s 9(1) of the Constitution which states: ‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law.’  
 
On the other hand, affirmative action enforced by the EEA is a remedial measure, which 
is a long-term goal aimed to achieve substantive equality.
44
 This implies that ‘affirmative 
action is a means to an end and not an end in itself’.45 In other words it can be concluded 
that affirmative action is an ongoing process until equality is achieved. Hence it is 
suggested that it is correct to conclude that the Constitution does not implement 
affirmative action but provides for a duty for implementation thereof.
46
 The principles 
contained in s 15 above were applied in Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & 
Others.
47
 In this matter a black police officer was appointed to a post in the SA Police 
Service (SAPS) instead of his white colleague who received the highest percentage mark 
during the interviews. The applicant accordingly claimed unfair discrimination in terms 
of s 9(3) of the Constitution.
48
 
 
The dispute was about an allegation of discrimination based on race, and the presumption 
is, that it is, indeed unfair unless the respondent can prove it was fair. The Court in 
Stoman held that discrimination on the grounds listed in s 9(3) of the Constitution was 
regarded as unfair unless it was established that the discrimination was fair. The Court in 
Stoman held further that the appointment of a black officer over a white one was not 
unjustifiable in view of the constitutional recognition of affirmative action measures.  
 
In other words, the Court in Stoman accepted actions to be taken to ensure the 
advancement of persons or categories of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. It is safe to deduce from the aforefoing that the court sanctioned 
affirmative action measures to address South Africa’s deep-rooted history of racial and 
systemic discrimination.  
                                                 
43 Thompson D ‘et al’ ‘Affirmative Action; Only A Shield? Or Also A Shield? (2007) 644. 
44 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law (2006) 397. 
45 Thompson D ‘et al’ ‘Affirmative Action; Only A Shield? Or Also A Shield?’ (2007) 644. 
46 Thompson D ‘et al’ ‘Affirmative Action; Only A Shield? Or Also A Shield?’ (2007) 645. 
47 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
48 ‘The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
    grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
    orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.’ 
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These measures undoubtedly contained an element of reverse discrimination sanctioned 
by the Constitution as fair.
49
 Van Rensburg is of the view that s 9(2) of the Constitution is 
directed at the previously disadvantaged and not whether the individual belongs to a 
specific race group.
50
 In other words in Van Rensburg’s view race is not a prerequisite to 
benefit from affirmative action.  
 
As previously stated, ‘Black people’ is inclusive of Africans, Coloureds and Indians. It 
follows that in terms of the EEA these are the black people who need to be advanced in 
terms of s 9(2) of the Constitution (the enabling Act) as they were discriminated against 
under the apartheid system. It is, therefore, submitted that although the Constitution does 
not refer to race directly, it is suggested that race is indirectly a determining factor in 
terms of the EEA to redress the disadvantages of the past. 
  
It is also equally true that not all white people benefited by the apartheid system and 
some find them in similar social conditions as the disadvantaged groups. But 
differentiation in terms of the EEA is defined in terms of race (with the exception of 
women and people with disabilities) and not on a person’s social status.  
 
It is suggested that in the absence of such differentiation (social status) white people who 
did not benefit from apartheid would in all likelihood not be entitled to enjoy the benefits 
of affirmative action. The inference to be drawn is that the differentiation in terms of the 
EEA is based on the group (disadvantaged) to which people belong and not on their 
social status. It is therefore, submitted, that Van Rensburg bases his argument above on 
the following obiter of the CC in Pretoria City Council v Walker:
51
  
 
‘No member of a racial group should be made to feel that they are  
 not deserving of equal ‘concern, respect and consideration’ and that  
 the law is likely to be used against them more harshly than others who  
 belong to other race groups’ 
 
At the same time Van Rensburg concedes that the Constitution granted affirmative action 
to those groups who were previously discriminated against, and who in all fairness refer 
to Black people (Africans, Coloureds and Indians).
 52
 Furthermore, Venter also argues 
that s 9(2) of the Constitution seeks to benefit certain people and that discrimination 
against or disadvantage of people were not the objective.
53
 Venter is further of the 
opinion that if affirmative action is to be achieved by means of a process of unfair 
discrimination, then such actions are unconstitutional.  
                                                 
49  Section 9(2) and (5). 
50 Van Rensburg LJ Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
     Grondwetlikheid (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 243.  
51  (1998) 2 SA 363 (CC); (1998) 3 BCLR 257 (CC) 81. 
52 Van Rensburg LJ Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
     Grondwetlikheid (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University 2004) 264.  
53 Venter J ‘Die Beperkings van Regstellende Gelykheid’ (2004) 28. 
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Steward supports Venter’s view in stating that ‘the achievement of equality for some 
cannot be realized by negating the right to equality of others’.54 In relation to the 
aforementioned views, the fairness of the application of affirmative action measures were 
tested in Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety & Security.
55
 The applicants, all white, 
argued that the South African Police Service discriminated unfairly against them in filling 
only eight of the 28 vacancies with people from the designated group without having a 
proper equity plan.  
 
The Court concluded that in the absence of such a plan and given the responsibility of the 
police to render effective services, such discrimination was unfair. Section 6(2) of the 
EEA read with s 9(2) of the Constitution addresses Venter’s and Steward`s concerns’ and 
s 9(5) of the Constitution justifies discrimination under certain circumstances as fair 
discrimination.
56
 Thus it is safe to conclude that the discrimination applied by SAPS in 
the Coetzer case (in the absence of a legitimate affirmative action plan) did not pass 
muster in terms of s 9(5) of the Constitution.  
 
However, in having regard to the views of Van Rensburg and Venter, the Court in 
Stoman held further that s 9(2) of the Constitution recognizes substantive equality rather 
than formal equality. The effect is that equality is more than mere non-discrimination 
and that s 9(2) of the Constitution and the EEA were measures designed to protect or 
advance persons or categories of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.
57
 
 
 
2.2.2 Formal and Substantive Equality 
 
The above suggests that the notion of formal equality is that everyone is treated 
according to a neutral standard (equal), unlike substantive equality which relates to 
measures to correct past disadvantages.
58
  
 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution forms the basis of formal equality and states:  
 
‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
 protection and benefit of the law.’ 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Steward D 2011 ‘Tutu, Moseneke and the ‘White Tax’ 
     http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb (accessed 22 August 2011).  
55 (2003) 24 ILJ 163 (LC).  
56 The Constitution s 9(5) ‘Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) 
    is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is unfair.’ 
57 Dupper O ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African Experience’ 14 ed (2002) SA  
    Merc LJ 275. ‘Substantive equality takes the circumstances of people into account and requires the law 
    to ensure equality of outcome.’ 
58 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004)25 LJ 822.   
 
 
 
 
23 
 
However, s 9(2), as opposed to s 9(1), justifies interference to achieve substantive 
equality and states:  
 
‘Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  
 To promote the achievement of equality, 
 legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
 categories  of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’ 
 
Dupper
59
 explain the difference as follows: 
 
‘In short, formal equality means sameness of treatment – the law 
 must treat persons in the same manner regardless of their 
 circumstances. Substantive equality takes the circumstances of 
 people into account and requires the law to ensure equality of outcome. 
             The Constitution, it is then stressed, requires us to look at substance. 
 It requires us to focus on the purpose or effects of rules and conduct 
 and not merely on their form.’ 
 
In normal circumstances formal equality would ensure that everybody be treated equally. 
However, given South Africa’s history, formal equality would not ensure that those 
discriminated against under apartheid would be able to enjoy equal opportunities similar 
to those who benefitted from apartheid.
60
 Hence substantive equality is the only vehicle 
to ensure the elimination of past disadvantages.
61
 Therefore, it would make no sense to 
treat people who were discriminated against equal with those who were not.
62
 This 
principle was clearly illustrated in Stoman in which the Court concluded that the 
appointment of a black candidate over a white one is justifiable in order to give effect to s 
9(2) of the Constitution and s 6(2) of the EEA to ensure the advancement of people in the 
designated group.  Goldstone J also expounded on the concepts in President of the 
Republic of SA v Hugo.
63
  
 
‘We need, therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
 recognizes that although a society which affords each human being equal 
 treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve 
 that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before the 
 goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will require a careful and thorough 
 understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular 
 people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers 
 the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one 
 context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.’ 
                                                 
59 Dupper O ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African Experience’ 14 ed (2002) SA 
    Merc LJ 275. 
60 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 822. 
61 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 822. 
62 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law’ (2006) 390. 
63 (1997) 1 SACR 567 (CC) 586. 
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In view of the above, the CC in Harksen
64
 found that the following factors are relevant to 
determine discrimination: 
 
- ‘The position of the complainant in society, e.g. whether the complainant 
  is part of a group that suffered disadvantages or is vulnerable; 
-  The nature of the provision or power; and 
-  The effect of the discrimination.’  
 
Moreover, ‘discrimination’ is also defined in ILO Convention 111 of 195865 as follows: 
 
‘(1) (a) Any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, 
            sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which 
            has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or 
            treatment in employment or occupation; (b) such other distinction, 
            exclusion or preference which has the effect of nullifying or impairing 
            equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation as may 
            be determined by the Member concerned after consultation with 
            representative employers’ and workers organizations, where such exist, 
            and with other appropriate bodies.  
 
(2) Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on 
      the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.’ 
 
The Convention
66
 obliges countries, including South Africa, to act pro-actively against all 
forms of racism.
67
 The objective is to ensure that measures will be taken to educate and 
advance certain racial as well as ethnic groups in ensuring equal enjoyment of rights. 
These measures will not necessarily be regarded as racial discrimination, which under 
normal circumstances are listed grounds of discrimination.
68
 The ILO Convention places 
an obligation on states to comply with its Article 2(2) which states: 
 
‘...when the circumstances so warrant, (to) take, in the social, economical, 
 cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate 
 development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to 
 them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of 
 human rights and fundamental freedom. 
                                                 
64 Harksen v Lane NO & Others (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC) 63 - 65. 
65 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation No.111 of the 
    International Labour Organization,1958. 
66
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,1965, United 
    Nations,Treaty Series, vol. 660. 
67 Articles 1(4), 2(2) of the Race Convention ‘It provides for the basis for future tests as to the 
    acceptability of such measures. It provides for time limits for the implementation of affirmative 
    action’. See also Dupper O ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African 
    experience’ (2002) (14) SA Merc LJ 280. ‘...So the State has a duty to act positively to correct the results 
    of such discrimination”. 
68 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law’ (2006) 389. See also the Constitution s 9(3). 
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Thus, affirmative action measures as implemented in South Africa in terms of the EEA 
are therefore not regarded as racial discrimination.
69
 In this regard s 9(2) of the 
Constitution granted approval of affirmative action measures to be in line with the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race 
Convention).  
 
Having regard to the above, the question arises: can it be concluded that the word ‘unfair’ 
limits the prohibition of discrimination and that employers could discriminate unless a 
court found it to be unfair?
70
 It is suggested that the Constitution, International Law and 
the EEA place an obligation on the state to act proactively to remedy a situation, and not 
to wait until a plaintiff sues for discrimination.
71
 
 
The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in Mias v Minister of Justice & Others
72
 (as discussed 
in par.2.8 hereafter) dealt with the question whether or not an action constitutes 
discrimination and states as follows: 
 
‘In short: Is there a differentiation? If so, is it discriminatory? If so, is it unfair either 
  directly, on one or more of the specified grounds, or indirectly?’ 
 
Section 3 of the EEA also states: 
 
‘This Act must be interpreted – 
(a) In compliance with the Constitution; 
(b) So as to give effect to its purpose; 
(c) Taking into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of this 
Act or any other employment law; and 
(d) In compliance with the international law obligations of the Republic, in 
particular those contained in the International Labour Organisation 
Convention (111) concerning Discrimination of Employment and 
Occupation.’ 
 
Thus, it is submitted that a correlation exists between ILO Convention 111, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
EEA (the Preamble) and the Constitution s 9(2)), and that they must be read together to 
determine whether discrimination exists, and if so, whether it is fair or not.
73
 The EEA, 
which is the implementation document provided for by s 9(2) of the Constitution 
complies with relevant International Conventions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 The Constitution s 9(5). 
70 Du Toit D ‘Labour Law from a working class perspective: Protection against Unfair Discrimination in 
    the Workplace: Are the Courts getting it Right?(2007) 3.     
71 Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 74. 
72 (2002) 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) 21. 
73 Du Toit D ‘Labour Law from a working class perspective: Protection against Unfair Discrimination in 
    the Workplace: Are the Courts getting it Right?’ (2007) 1.  
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2.2.3 Suitably Qualified 
 
The EEA s 20(3) defines ‘suitably qualified’ people as follows; 
 
‘For the purpose of this Act, a person may be suitably qualified for a job as a 
 result of any one of, or any combination of that person`s:-  
(a)  Formal qualifications; 
(b)  Prior learning; 
(c)  Relevant experience; or  
(d) Capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the 
      job.’ 
 
As indicated in chapter 1, s 42 of the EEA currently states ‘that in determining whether a 
designated employer is implementing employment equity in compliance with this Act, 
the Director-General of Labour must take into account factors which include but are not 
limited to’:  
 
‘...the extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different 
 designated groups are equitably be represented within each occupational 
 category and level in that employer`s workforce in relation to the (i) 
 demographic profile of the national and regional economically active 
 population; (ii) pool of suitably qualified people from designated groups from 
 which the employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint 
 employees.’ (own emphasis) 
 
On the face of it, it can be inferred that the Director-General of Labour has no discretion 
in applying his or her mind with regard to ‘suitably qualified’ people, as well as 
‘national’ and ‘regional’ demographics. However, it appears that in terms of s 42 an 
employer has discretion as it may appoint or promote suitably qualified people as the 
term may seems not to be compelling.  
 
It is also suggested that the Director-General must consider both the national and regional 
demographics and cannot ignore the one in favour of the other. The phrase ‘may appoint’ 
suggests that the employer is not compelled to make such appointments. However, it 
appears that if the employer lacks acceptable levels of redress in its workplace, that it 
should justify such failure to the Director-General of Labour. The powers of the Director-
General in this regard will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
In the Stoman
74
 case the suitability of a person for appointment was also under 
consideration. The Court rejected the view of the Court in Public Servants Association of 
SA & Others v Minister of Justice
75
 that the appointment of a candidate from one race 
group above a candidate from another race group was only acceptable where the 
candidates all had broadly the same qualifications and merits.  
 
                                                 
74 Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
75 (1997) 3 SA 925 (T). 
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The Court in Stoman also noted that the principle is too restrictive to give meaningful 
effect to the objective of the Constitution and the measures to ensure equality. However, 
the Court stated that the appointment of a ‘wholly unqualified’ or less than ‘suitably 
qualified’ or incapable person in a responsible position could never be justified.76 
 
Given the aforesaid, it is evident that an employer should strike a balance between s 20 
(3) and all other relevant factors in determining an appointment of somebody from the 
designated groups. It thus suffices to state that substantive equality can never be used as a 
defence to the appointment of a ‘wholly unqualified’ person in a position of 
responsibility. 
 
 
2.2.4 Right of Designated Employee to be Appointed or Promoted 
 
The salient question now arises: whether a designated employee has a right to be 
appointed or promoted because he or she belongs to the designated groups? This question 
was first addressed in Harmse v City of Cape Town.
77
 The Court held that a failure by the 
employer to remove discriminatory barriers may in certain instances found a claim of 
indirect discrimination. The Court was also of the view that in so doing, an employer 
violates a designated employee’s right not to be discriminated against. It is suggested that 
such failure by the employer is contrary to s 5
78
 read with s 15(2)(a) of the EEA.
79
  
 
The Labour Court in Harmse also held that the Constitution and the EEA provide a 
justiciable right to affirmative action. On the face of it, the Harmse judgment appears to 
recognize the individual right of an employee to affirmative action. In contrast to the 
Harmse case, the LAC in Dudley v City of Cape Town & another 
80
 and the Labour Court 
in Thekiso v IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd
81
 concluded that affirmative action does not 
provide an enforceable right to individual employees for preferential treatment.  
                                                 
76 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
77 (2003) 6 BLLR 557 (LC). 
78 ‘Every employer must take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair 
     discrimination in any employment policy or practice.’ 
79 ‘Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must include: (a) measures to   
     identify and eliminate employment barriers, including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect 
     people  from designated groups; (b) measures designed to further diversity in the workplace based on 
     equal dignity and  respect of all people; (c) making reasonable accommodation for people from 
     designated groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably represented 
     in the workforce of a designated employer; (d) … measures to: (i) ensure the equitable representation of 
     suitably qualified people from designated groups in all  occupational categories and levels in the 
     workforce; and (ii) retain and develop people from designated groups and to implement appropriate 
     training measures, including measures in terms of an Act of Parliament providing for skills 
     development.’ 
80 (2008) 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC). 
81 (2007) 3 BLLR 253 (LC). 
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Van Rensburg 
82
 has a concern with the Dudley judgment in this regard as he is of the 
view that the word ‘persons’ (individuals) in s 9(2) of the Constitution should be analysed 
in its context which states:  
 
‘...To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
 designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
 by unfair discrimination may be taken.’ (own emphasis) 
 
Dupper
83
on the other hand is of the view that substantive equality compels the 
government to prevent the continuation of discrimination and essentially counter the 
individual right to affirmative action. Dupper’s argument is also supported by the 
judgment in Stoman in which the Court emphasized the collective nature of affirmative 
action: 
 
‘The emphasis is certainly on the group or category of persons, of which the 
  particular individual happens to be a member, or, more starkly put in the 
  negative, of which a specific person such as the applicant in this case is not a 
 member. This group has been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The aim is 
 not to reward the fourth respondent as an individual but to advance the category 
 of persons to which he belongs and to achieve substantive equality in the SAPS 
 as an important component of the South African society.’ 84 
 
Once again given the view of Van Rensburg, the Court declined to define the word 
‘persons’ and thereby failed to provide direction as to the intention of the legislature with 
regard to the use of the word ‘persons’ in the context of s 9(2) of the Constitution.  
 
The only conclusion validly to be drawn from the use of the word ‘persons’ is that it 
should be interpreted in the context of a category of persons and does not imply an 
individual right to affirmative action. Apon
85
 is of the view that the Dudley case is too 
narrow to give effect to the constitutional objectives as it does not promote the spirit of 
substantive equality. It is further submitted that the Court in Dudley case treated two 
candidates, one designated and the other non-designated, on an equal footing with no 
regard to preferential treatment as provided for in s 9(2) of the Constitution and s 2 of the 
EEA. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
    Grondwetlikheid (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 264. 
83 Dupper O ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African Experience’ 14 ed (2002) SA 
    Merc LJ 280. 
84 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T) 1035. 
85 Apon L ‘et al’ ‘Does a right to be appointed exist for designated groups? The boundaries of 
    employment equity’ (2010) 346. 
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It must be borne in mind that the Court in Dudley did not decide the question whether the 
failure of the employer to appoint the applicant, who was a designated employee, 
constituted unfair discrimination or not. The Court concluded that the applicant did not 
have locus standi to approach the Labour Court directly, as she had not exhausted the 
remedies set out in Chapter V of the EEA. The latter will be discussed in chapter 4 
hereafter. 
 
 
2.2.5 Citizenship 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution states ‘...that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
united in our diversity...’ With the Preamble as background there is a presumption that 
neither s 9(2) of the Constitution nor the EEA excludes non-South Africans. This issue 
was argued in the case of Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town.
86
 
 
The applicant successfully argued that the concept of affirmative action as envisaged by 
the Constitution and regulated by the labour laws is one which is developed to address 
designated groups in the context and history of South Africa. The applicant, who 
happened to be a white person, was not appointed to a post at the University, and argued 
that one of the successful candidates appointed, although black, was not a citizen of 
South Africa. The applicant submitted that a non-citizen did not qualify to be a 
beneficiary of the University’s affirmative policy. 
 
Although the LAC concluded that Chibale, a non-citizen, was appointed on merit, it 
stated that the University’s affirmative action policy was indeed designed to address the 
imbalances in the Republic of South Africa; and that the LRA and affirmative action as 
envisaged by the Constitution were developed against the background of South Africa’s 
history of discrimination. In essence the Court found that only South African citizens 
qualify to benefit from affirmative action.
87
 
 
In the event that citizenship is used in the context of affirmative action, it is imperative to 
establish whether the use of citizenship is discriminatory, and, if so, whether it constitutes 
unfair discrimination. This test to determine whether an act constitutes unfair 
discrimination or not was equally expounded by the LAC in Mias v Minister of Justice & 
Others.
88
 In this case the appellant an attorney who practised for his own account, applied 
for a position as State Attorney. Whilst residing in Port Elizabeth he happened to be 
successful to be appointed in Cape Town.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC). 
87 (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC) 2656. 
88 (2002) 1 BLLR 1 (LAC). 
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The appellant was only entitled to the limited re-location benefits granted a new 
appointee to the public service. These benefits were substantially less than benefits which 
were only applicable to existing public servant transfers. It follows that the appellant 
alleged that the differentiation between the different benefits for employees constituted a 
‘residual unfair labour practice’89 in terms of the LRA. The LAC noted as follows: ‘It 
was not in dispute that the settled constitutional jurisprudence on unfair discrimination is 
applicable to the item. In short: Is there a differentiation? If so, is it discriminatory? If so, 
is it unfair either directly, on one or more of the specified grounds, or indirectly (which 
affects the burden of proof).’ 90 
 
Neither the Constitution nor the LRA
91
 saw non-citizenship as a listed ground of 
discrimination. The CC in Harksen v Lane NO & Others
 92
 found citizenship and HIV 
status to be unlisted grounds. The effect is that in the event of an unlisted ground the onus 
to prove discrimination rests on the applicant.
93
 This is an objective enquiry; motive or 
intent is not relevant.
94
   
 
The inference to be drawn from the fact that citizenship is not a listed ground to 
constitute discrimination is that the purpose of affirmative action is to achieve equality 
for South African citizens only.
95
 This view is not without criticism as it seems to be in 
contrast with the Preamble of the Constitution as indicated before. It is, therefore, 
submitted that the South African community is made up of citizens and non-citizens and 
that non-citizens also were either directly or indirectly affected by unfair discrimination.
96
  
 
Although the preamble of the EEA also acknowledges the discriminatory laws and 
disparities in employment which were caused by apartheid, it is a fact that foreigners are 
a vulnerable minority group in South Africa, and that they could suffer unfair 
discrimination irrespective of whether it is a listed or unlisted ground.
97
 Given the current 
application of affirmative action and that citizenship is an unlisted ground, the question 
whether the exclusion of non-citizens constitutes discrimination or not, needs still to be 
clarified by the CC.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). Part B, items 2(1)(a) or (b), of schedule 7. ‘Residual unfair 
     labour practice. For the purpose of this item, an unfair labour practice means any unfair act of 
     omission that arises between an employer and employee.’  
90 (2002) 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) 21. 
91 The LRA s 187(1)(f). 
92 (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC). 
93 (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC) 63. 
94 (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC) 62. 
95 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law’ (2006) 400. 
96 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law’ (2006) 400. 
97 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
    international law’ (2006) 402 - 403. 
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2.2.6 Differentiation  
 
The term ‘differentiation’ points to different treatment of people which is justifiable 
under certain circumstances.
98
 It follows that discrimination is prohibited in terms of s 
9(3) of the Constitution,
99
 unless it is justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution
100
 to 
enjoy constitutional approval in terms of s 9(5)
101
.  
 
As stated before, the effect of s 9(1) of the Constitution is that all people should be 
treated equally. However, as previously stated, this approach would not assist the 
government to address the imbalances caused by apartheid. As a result of the need to 
address past imbalances, s 9(2) of the Constitution was enacted to ensure that equality in 
the workplace is implemented. It is at this instance that s 36 of the Constitution comes 
into play in order to legitimize legislation and other measures to address and to eliminate 
the inequalities created by past discrimination by implementing affirmative action for the 
disadvantaged.
102
 
 
Given the definition of ‘designated groups’ it appears to include women of all races. The 
question whether the EEA presumed further differentiation amongst women on the basis 
of colour was mooted by the Labour Court in PSA obo Karriem v SAPS & Another.
103
 In 
this case two women, the one white, the other coloured, contended for a position. The 
coloured female employee claimed she was discriminated against because the white 
female was ultimately appointed.   
 
Although the Labour Court found that the white female was appointed on merit, it was 
confirmed that she was also part of the designated groups. In essence, then, the Court 
concluded that all women enjoy equal status in terms of affirmative action regardless of 
race. The Constitution as well as the LRA is not clear as to whether further differentiation 
between males, unlike women, within the meaning of ‘designated groups’ is presumed. 
The Constitution s 9(2) provides for measures to advance people who were previously 
disadvantaged by apartheid. The EEA, in turn, categorizes those previously 
disadvantaged people as a ‘designated groups’. 
                                                 
98  McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated       
      against international law’ (2006)  390. 
99 ‘The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
      grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
      orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” 
100 ‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
       that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open democratic society  based on human 
       dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – (a) the nature of the  
       right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
      (d)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
       purpose. (2) except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution no law 
       may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
101 ‘Discrimination on or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
       the discrimination is fair.’ 
102  McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
       international law’ (2006) 390. 
103  (2007) 4 BLLR 308 (LC). 
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It follows that s 9(2) of the Constitution should be utilized to promote the designated 
group which includes Blacks, Coloureds, Indians, women and people with disabilities. 
Hence, the presumption is that differentiation within the designated group with specific 
reference to ‘Black’ people was not presumed. 
 
A related question was dealt with in Baxter v National Commissioner of Correctional 
Services & Another.
104
  In this case a coloured male was recommended to be appointed as 
a Director. The recommendation was denied on the basis that his appointment does not 
promote the Department’s equity plan, despite the fact that the Department’s plan 
indicated that a coloured appointment is justified, and that he was also in all 
circumstances ‘suitably qualified’ to be appointed as well as being part of the designated 
groups. 
 
The Court found in favour of the applicant and concluded that, despite the shortcomings 
of the Department of Correctional Services’ equity plan (which favoured a coloured 
appointment), the employee was unfairly discriminated against, since he was also part of 
the designated groups and thus a beneficiary of affirmative action. One can also argue 
that the Baxter case corresponds with the view of the CC in Pretoria City Council v 
Walker
105
 (as quoted before), in which the court warns that laws should not be used more 
harshly against a certain race group to treat them in an undeserving manner.  
 
The same question was dealt with in IMAWU v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional 
Local Council.
106
 In this case two white and three black candidates were subjected to an 
internal test for the position of town treasurer. The Court found that the black appointee 
received the lowest marks of all, including of the three black candidates. The Court in 
dealing with a claim of alleged unfair discrimination noted obiter that, in the event that 
members of the same designated groups compete with each other, the best possible 
candidate from the designated group should be appointed.
107
  
 
In other words, merit and experience alone should be the yardstick when it involves only 
the members of a designated group.
108
 The inference validly to be drawn from this 
decision is that any further differentiation amongst the members of designated groups 
might constitute unfair discrimination.  
 
Although the Court in Baxter found in favour of the applicant, it is doubtful whether the 
judgment would have been the same if the Department of Correctional Services’ equity 
plan had not supported a coloured appointment. Therefore, the Baxter as well as the Louis 
Trichardt judgments cannot be perceived as benchmark decisions in ensuring equal 
treatment among the members of the designated groups.  
                                                 
104 (2006) ZALC 23 (LC). 
105 (1998) 2 SA 363 (CC); (1998) 3 BCLR 257 (CC) 81. 
106 (2000) 21 ILJ 1119 (LC). 
107 (2000) 21 ILJ 1119 (LC) 1129 B-D. 
108 Dupper O ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African Experience’ 14 ed (2002) SA 
     Merc LJ 290. 
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It follows, that in terms of the rules of precedent other courts are not compelled to adhere 
to the said judgments and they can also be replaced by a judgment of the CC. They do, 
however, establish a valuable legal guideline on how to deal with members of the 
designated groups competing amongst themselves.  
 
Before the coming into effect of the Constitution, affirmative action was also enshrined 
under s 8(3) of the interim Constitution which stated: 
 
‘This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate 
  protection and advancement of persons and groups or categories of persons 
  disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal 
  enjoyment of all rights and freedoms... .’109 
 
Whether differentiation within the designated groups in terms of s 8(3) of the Interim 
Constitution was acceptable, was dealt with in Motala v University of Natal.
110
 In this 
case an Indian student who had obtained five distinctions in matric was refused 
admission into the medical school. The medical school had decided to limit 40 to the 
number of Indian students admitted to its programme, because of the poor standard of 
education available to African students meant that a merit based entrance programme 
would result in very few African applicants being accepted into medical school.  
 
The question was whether the University’s affirmative action programme was justified to 
discriminate against an Indian student with five distinctions in favour of a black student.  
The Court in Motala held within the context of s 8(3) of the Interim Constitution, 
although both applicants belonged to the designated groups, the admission policy was 
indeed a measure designed to achieve adequate protection and to advance people 
previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
The Motala case should be seen in the context of the four-tier educational system which 
was in existence at the time which seriously disadvantaged African students by providing 
them with a sub-standard qualification. Subsequently the educational system has changed 
drastically and very limited differences exist. 
 
The importance of the impact of the Motala judgment is that it disadvantages people who 
were already disadvantaged in the past.
111
 It is, therefore, submitted that this will further 
disadvantage Indians and Coloureds in relation to whites and leave Indians and Coloureds 
behind with regard to Africans.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 The Constitution of South Africa, Act 2000 of 1993. 
110 (1995) BCLR 374 (D). 
111 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
      Grondwetlikheid’ (unpublished LLD thesis North-West University, 2004) 259. 
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The proposal by government to amend s 42 of the EEA (discussed hereafter) would in all 
probability prejudice the other members of designated groups if the Motala principle is 
going to apply. In the event, the Motala principle is going to be followed, the EEA should 
be interpreted to consider the extent to which the effects of apartheid are still felt in 
society and how they have prejudiced the different race categories within the 
disadvantaged groups. In other words this approach will recognize the existence of 
degrees of disadvantage.
112
 
 
Subsequently, the Constitution came into effect and the EEA was enacted which 
subscribed to s 9(2) of the Constitution to ensure that affirmative action measures are 
designed and enforced. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the courts and specifically the 
CC will follow the line as set in the Motala case.  
 
In this regard the proposed amendments to s 42 of the EEA (as referred to in chapter 1) 
seek to remove the reference to ‘national and regional’ demographics in s 42(a)(i), 
while completely removing s 42(a) (ii) to 42(a)(v). These proposed amendments 
resulted in some controversy in light of the comments made by the former Director-
General of Labour, Jimmy Manyi, in that coloureds are over-represented in the Western 
Cape and should spread out to the rest of the country.
113
  
 
Although it appears to be an accepted principle to advance formerly disadvantaged 
groups in order to rectify the imbalances of the past, the proposed amendments to s 42 
might be construed or interpreted as discriminating amongst the disadvantaged groups 
themselves. The reality is that, while most employees from the disadvantaged groups 
claim an equal right or have reasonable expectations to benefit from affirmative action, 
the proposed amendments to s 42 seems to limit those prospects for certain 
disadvantaged groups. It is, therefore, submitted that there is a risk that a principle of 
‘first among equals’ might become a practice in the South African context.  
 
The proposed amendments should accordingly be measured in light of South Africa’s 
obligations in terms of the Constitution, the goals of the EEA, as well as against the 
definitions of ‘discrimination’ in terms of ILO Convention C111, 1958.114 It should also 
be borne in mind that any decision made in terms of the relevant sections of the EEA, 
should also be in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act.
115
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 Parinton J ‘et al’ ‘The Development of Defences in Unfair Discrimination Cases (Part 2)’(2005) 600. 
113 Hlongwane S (Analysis): ‘Jimmy Manyi finds out just how tough it is to be between Manuel and  a hard 
      place’ The Daily Maverick  2 March 2011 5 as well as Graham S ‘Manyi Coloured remarks cast 
      doubt on  job suitability’ The Citizen  2 March 2011 6. 
114 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation No.111 of the            
     International Labour Organisation, 1958. 
115 Promotion Administration of Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (hereafter the PAJA). 
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Thus it is suggested that the government`s intention with regard to the proposed 
amendments to s 42 of the EEA was to give effect to the principle of ‘differentiation’ 
within the context of the Motala judgment. Government departments, e.g. the department 
of Correctional Services, already implement their equity policies in terms of the proposed 
amendments to s 42 of the EEA.  
 
The above proposals have caused serious concern amongst coloured members of the 
Department of Correctional Services
116
 who claim they are also from the designated 
groups (Black people) and are equally entitled to the benefits of affirmative action. As a 
result a labour dispute between employees and the Department of Correctional Services 
(The Department) in terms of the application of s 42 (a)(i) has been filed in the Labour 
Court.
117
 The facts are in short the following: The Department’s Employment Equity Plan 
for the period 2010 to 2014 was adopted after consultation with employee organisations.  
 
The national targets that were agreed upon were 79.3% for Africans, 9.3% for Whites, 
3.5% for Indians and 8.8% for Coloureds. The workforce representivity status (national) 
for the period 2010 to 2014 is 67.8% for Africans, 15.7% for Whites, 3.5% for Indians 
and 13% for Coloureds. As a result of these targets the Department received a written 
memorandum from 7 Coloured Senior Management System (SMS) members, objecting 
to the use of the national demographics, as it creates employment barriers for coloureds 
which are prohibited in terms of s 15(4) of the EEA.  
 
The department argues that it is defined as a national Department under schedule 1 issued 
in terms of s 7(2)(a) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 and is therefore entitled to 
apply the national demographics. The current application of the demographics (s 42 
(a)(i)) by the Department of Correctional Services results in the differentiation within 
designated groups which is detrimental to certain members of that group.
118
 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the implementation of the EEA should be in line with the 
spirit as set out in the Van Heerden
119
 case, in which Moseneke J stated:  
 
‘In particular, a measure should not constitute an abuse of power or impose such 
 substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its benefits that our long-
 term constitutional goal would be threatened.’120 
 
Cooper,
121
 as stated before, is also of the view that an employee would suffer indirect 
discrimination when criteria, conditions or policies apply which appear to be neutral but 
which adversely affect a disproportionate number of members of a certain group. It is 
submitted that this is the case with regard to the Department of Correctional Services.  
                                                 
116 Dawie – Rubriek ‘DKD is nou op dun ys oor ras’ Die Burger  25 February 2012 8. 
117 Solidarity & Others v Department of Correctional Service & Others (Case No.C368/2012). 
118 Hlongwane S (Analysis): ‘Jimmy Manyi finds out just how tough it is to be between Manuel and a hard 
      place’ The Daily Maverick  2 March 2011 5, as well as Graham S ‘Manyi Coloured remarks 
      cast doubt on job suitability’ The Citizen  2 March 2011 6. 
119 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (2004) 6 SA 121. 
120 (2004) 6 SA 44. 
121 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 826. 
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Thus, as explained above, the proposed amendments to s 42 which government intends to 
implement would in all probability be in contradiction of the spirit of Van Heerden, and 
in Cooper`s view would constitute unfair discrimination. Following the above, the LAC 
in Dudley concluded that an employee has a cause of action (for unfair discrimination) 
only after the employee challenges the failure of an employer to give effect to affirmative 
action measures in terms of Chapter V of the EEA.  
 
It follows that an employee should first report such failure to the Director-General of 
Labour who will in turn approach the Labour Court for a compliance order after 
alternative remedies are exhausted.
122
 However, it is submitted that (as discussed in 
chapter 5, hereafter) that the Director-General of Labour cannot, currently, legally 
compel designated employers to apply national and regional demographics. Although the 
Baxter case was interpretive of the term ‘designated groups,’ regard must be given to the 
equity plan of the Department of Correctional Services which favoured the applicant.  
 
The LC in Harmse v City of Cape Town
123
concluded that when a designated employer 
developed an affirmative action plan, its employees acquire a legitimate expectation that 
it will be implemented accordingly.
124
 Similar to the Harmse case, the LAC in Dudley 
cautioned against ad hoc appointments and promotions. It stated that the employer would 
run the risk of being at odds with a collectively determined equity plan.
125
 This was 
confirmed in the Louis Trichardt case (as stated above) in which the LC concluded that 
the affirmative action appointment did not pass muster as the employer failed to 
implement an affirmative action program as required in terms of a collective 
agreement.
126
 
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the Court in Baxter followed the principle as applied 
in Harmse, 
127
 given the fact that the affirmative action plan favoured the applicant. The 
views of both Harmse and Dudley were supported by the LC in Coetzer & Others v 
Minister of Safety & Security.
128
 The LC in Coetzer concluded that, among other factors, 
it is unfair in the absence of an equity plan for the SA Police Service not to appoint white 
candidates to positions in the explosive unit which were reserved for previously 
disadvantaged people only. The court in the Louis Trichardt case followed the same line 
in stating that an employer cannot justify an affirmative action appointment if it failed to 
comply with a collective agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 (2008) 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC) 12. 
123 (2003) 6 BLLR 557 (LC). 
124 (2003) 6 BLLR 557 (LC) 49. 
125 (2008) 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC) 52. 
126 (2000) 21 ILJ 1119 (LC). 
127 (2003) 6 BLLR 557 (LC) 47: ‘If an employer fails to promote equality through affirmative action 
      measures, that employer violates the rights of designated employees not to be discriminated against.’ 
128 (2003) 24 ILJ 163 (LC) 31. 
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2.3 Operational Requirements 
 
Operational requirements is another measure (other than affirmative action) which 
justifies fair discrimination in exceptional circumstances (inherent requirement) which 
are determined in terms of s 2 of ILO Convention 111
129
 and in terms of s 6(2)(b) of the 
EEA.
130
 The aforegoing was applied in PSA obo Karriem v SAPS & Another 
131
 in which 
the Court found that ‘operational requirements’ outweighed employment equity 
considerations, and that this complies with the provisions of the ILO and EEA as 
discussed hereafter. 
 
The application of ‘operational requirements’ as applied in Kariem, as a justifiable 
ground against a claim of unfair discrimination was also demonstrated in the case of 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead.
132
 In the Whitehead case, the respondent, a pregnant 
women claimed unfair discrimination by the appellant as she was not appointed because 
of her pregnancy. The appellant argued that it was a requirement that the successful 
applicant should at least work continuously for at least 12 months.  
 
The appellant conceded that the pregnancy was a determining factor as the respondent 
would not be able to comply with that requirement. In this case the Court concluded that 
‘inherent’ requirement meant an ‘indispensable attribute’ which relates to an inescapable 
way to perform a job.
133
 A matter of urgency or a commercial rationale would not 
suffice.
134
 In terms of the ILO any ‘limitation’ in this regard must be required by the 
characteristics of the job and should be in proportion to its requirements.
135
  
 
It follows that such an ‘inherent’ requirement should be a permanent characteristic of the 
job.
136
 It follows further that a complainant, having regard to the above, will bear the 
onus to prove the elements of discrimination as decided in Harksen.
137
 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Given the above it can be concluded that constitutional jurisprudence has accepted 
affirmative action measures and inherent requirements as justifiable grounds for fair 
discrimination in an attempt to redress past imbalances in the workplace.  
 
                                                 
129 Article 1(2) ‘Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent  
     requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.’ 
130 ‘It is not unfair discrimination to- distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent 
      requirement of a job.’ 
131 (2007) 4 BLLR 308 (LC). 
132 (2000) 21 ILJ 571 (LAC). 
133 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 835. 
134 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 835. 
135 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation No.111 of the 
     International Labour Organization, 1958. 
136 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 835. 
137 (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC) 63. 
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Therefore, affirmative action granted differentiation in the context of substantive 
equality; and that the grounds provided to advance persons within the context of the 
‘designated groups’ are not arbitrary, therefore not discriminatory. Given South Africa’s 
history, inequalities cannot be addressed in terms of formal equality. It has to be done in a 
restitutionary manner which is consonant with the concept of substantive equality.  
 
Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, therefore, focuses on the group and rejects 
the emphasis on individualism. In terms of the cases as discussed above, an employer can 
only use affirmative action appointments as a shield if it has programs in place to give 
effect to the objectives of the EEA. It is obvious that the primary objective of the EEA is 
to ensure equal representation in the workplace. Whether the EEA intended 
differentiation within the designated groups themselves to achieve its goals is at this stage 
not clear.  
 
However, both differentiation within the context of the Motala
138
 judgment and 
citizenship in terms of Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town
139
 are still unclear and 
remain very contentious issues. It is, however, suggested that the decision in IMAWU v 
Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local Government
140
 establishes an acceptable 
criterion to apply in the event that differentiation within the designated groups is 
applicable. Given the uncertainty, the Constitutional Court would in all probability be the 
final arbiter with regard to whether differentiation within the ‘designated groups’ itself 
would constitute, in the current, democratic dispensation, unfair discrimination or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 (1995) BCLR 374 (D). 
139 (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC). 
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39 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NAMIBIA AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSTITUTION AND 
EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
 
3. The United States of America 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Affirmative action has it origin in the United States of America.
141
 The disadvantages 
suffered by minorities in America dates from the time of slavery, whereas in South Africa 
the disadvantages suffered by the majority of blacks originated from apartheid and 
colonialism.
142
 Affirmative action was the result of activity by the Civil Rights 
Movement, similar to the African National Congress (ANC) and other groups in South 
Africa that embarked on various forms of mass action to ensure the elimination of racial 
inequalities which existed at the time.
143
  
 
As a result the American government embarked on processes to ensure equal treatment to 
minority groups in terms of jobs and education.
144
 The Fourteenth Amendment, of the US 
Constitution which included the equal protection
145
 and equal opportunity
146
 clauses were 
enacted. 
 
The SA Constitution also encompasses notions of equal protection, anti-discrimination 
and affirmative action.
147
 Although there are similarities between the South African and 
the US equal employment measures, they are not the same. The South African 
Constitution, for instance, acknowledges the notion of formal equality,
148
 as is the case in 
the US, but to rectify the imbalances of the past it also embraces the substantive approach 
to equality.
149
 The enforcement measures and assessment of the relevant laws will be 
discussed in chapter 4 and 5 hereafter. 
 
 
                                                 
141 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 9. See also Duppert O 
      ‘Affirmative  Action and Substantive Equality. The South African Experience’ 14 ed (2002) SA Merc LI 
      275. 
142 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
      Grondwetlikheid’ (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 73. 
143 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 9. 
144 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 9. 
145 Ratified in 1868 and was applicable to the states only. 
146 Sections 703(a)(1); 703(a)(2). 
147 Wing A ‘The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United States’ 24 ed (2008) 75. 
148 The Constitution s 9(1). 
149 The Constitution s 9(2). 
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3.2 Affirmative Action in the US 
 
In terms of the US Constitution the American Federal government is not the primary 
government and governance was left to the states.
150
 Although the American Constitution 
was amended with the Fourteenth Amendment to provide for equal protection, it did not 
provide for the right to equality similar to s 9(2) of the South African Constitution. 
Subsequent to the decision in Dred Scott v Sandford,
151
 in which it was decided that no 
person of African descent, whether freedman or slave, even if they were born in the USA, 
could qualify as an American citizen, amendments were made to the Constitution.
152
 
Hence the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and the so-called ‘equal protection 
clause’ of the Amendment states as follows: 
 
‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States...are citizens of the United 
 States and of the states wherein they reside... and (no state) shall... deprive any 
 person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any 
 person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.’153 (own emphasis) 
 
It is submitted that the use of the word ‘person’ indicates that the equal protection clause 
embraces individualism. Individualism was clearly demonstrated in the Stotts
154
 case in 
which a union that consisted of non-minorities challenged lay-offs and demanded that 
blacks with less service than their white colleagues should be laid off as well. The court 
emphasized victim specificity by making it clear that each individual had to prove that 
they indeed suffered from past discrimination.  
 
Although a victim of past discrimination might be successful in proving individual 
prejudice he or she will not automatically succeed in being awarded the position he or she 
was deprived of in the past. Adopting this formal approach to equality, the court 
concluded that the seniority system supersedes affirmative action plans and that it had 
limited powers to award those who could prove individual prejudice.
155
 The inference to 
be drawn from the above is that unlike the South African Constitution, the protection 
granted in terms of equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not 
embraced substantive equality with regard to the minority groups.
156
  
 
 
                                                 
150 The Constitution of the United States of America (1787) and ratified in September 1787. Art. IV s 4 
     ‘The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and 
      shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive 
      (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.’ 
151 60 US 393 (1857). 
152 McGregor M ‘The Application of Affirmative Action in Employment law with specific reference to the 
     Beneficiaries: A Comparative Study’ (unpublished LLD thesis, Unisa, 2005) 214. 
153 The Fourteenth Amendment: S 1 of the ‘Equal Protection Clause’. 
154 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v Stotts 104 S Ct 2576 (1984). 
155 McGregor M ‘The Application of Affirmative Action in Employment law with specific reference to the 
     Beneficiaries: A Comparative Study’ (unpublished LLD thesis, Unisa, 2005) 250. 
156 104 S Ct 2576 (1984). 
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Similarly to the equal protection clause, the word ‘persons’ as previously stated is also 
used in s 9(2) of the South African Constitution which states:  
 
‘Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
  freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
 other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories 
 of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’ 
 (own emphasis) 
 
Although the word ‘persons’ is used, the Constitution does not entertain individualism, 
but concentrates on the group as decided in the Stoman case.
157
 This is a very clear 
distinction from the American affirmative action focus.  
 
A dissenting judgment of Judge Blackmun in the Stotts case is in line with how South 
African courts interpret and apply the provisions of the Constitution and the EEA. His 
view is that an affirmative action plan was more group-based than individual based. This 
approach embraces the notion that the purpose of affirmative action was to provide a 
remedy for the discriminated-against ‘group as a whole’, rather than for any of the 
individual members of the group.
158
 With regard to the equal protection clause it can be 
concluded that it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination, but that due process should 
be followed if such rights are infringed. The South African Constitution, s 9(3), unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is very explicit and states: 
 
‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
 anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
 pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
 orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
 language and birth.’ 
 
‘Fair’ discrimination in a South African context is very controversial. This is only 
possible in terms of the EEA, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
159
 
(PEPUDA), and either s 9(5) or s 36 of the Constitution. However, the significance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is that it paved the way for affirmative action in the US.  
                                                 
157 (2002) 23 ILJ 1010 (T) 1035, in which the court emphasized the collective nature of affirmative 
     action: ’The emphasis is certainly on the group or category of persons, of which the particular 
     individual happens to be a member, or, more starkly put in the negative, of which a specific person 
     such as the applicant in this case is not a member. This group has been disadvantaged by unfair 
     discrimination. The aim is not to reward the fourth respondent as an individual but to advance the 
     category of persons to which he belongs and to achieve substantive equality in the SAPS as  an 
     important component of the South African society.’ 
158 104 S Ct 2576 (1984) 2606. 
159 Act 4 of 2000. 
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In essence the amendment forbade states in the US to create laws which violates the 
rights as enshrined by the equal protection clause.
160
 Subsequent to the constitutional 
amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted and s 1 states: 
 
 ‘That all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, 
   excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States, and 
   such citizens, of every race or color... .’  
 
Similarly to the Civil Rights Act, s 20 of the South African Constitution declares that ‘no 
person may be deprived of citizenship’. Contrary to the American Constitution, which did 
not make any provision for the protection of human dignity, the South African 
Constitution in terms of s 10 recognizes human dignity as a core value under the Bill of 
Rights.
161
 As a result the equal protection clause was not without controversy as it was 
challenged in various court cases. Plessy v Furguson
162
 considered the validity of 
legislation applied by the state of Louisiana which provided for separate, but equal, 
railway carriages for Negroes and whites. The majority of the Supreme Court found the 
legislation to be reasonable given the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’. As stated above the 
equal protection clause did not explicitly prohibit discrimination and states could 
implement laws of this nature. However, this decision was not without criticism and 
Judge Harlan in his dissenting judgment in the Plessey case noted the following: 
 
‘The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country ... But in view 
 of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, 
 dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is 
 color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of 
 civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the 
 most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his 
 surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme 
 law of the land are involved … In my opinion, the judgement this day rendered 
 will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
 in the Dred Scott case.’163 
 
The Plessy decision was overridden by the Brown v Board of Education
164
 case. In 
Brown the Supreme Court concluded that segregation of children in public schools on the 
basis of race deprived Negro children of equal educational opportunities. In essence the 
Supreme Court in Brown found that the ‘separate but equal’ policy is in conflict with the 
Fourteenth Amendment ‘equal protection clause’. It is submitted that this judgment 
embraces the Fourteenth Amendment and set the stage for affirmative action in the 
workplace as well.  
                                                 
160 Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954). The Supreme Court overrode the ‘separate but equal’ 
     decision in the Plessy case in concluding that segregation of children in public schools on the basis of 
     race deprived Negro children of equal education opportunities. 
161 ‘Everybody has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.' 
162 163 US 537 (1896). 
163 163 US 537 (1896) 559. 
164 347 US 483 (1954). 
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Following the Brown judgment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
165
 was enacted to 
implement affirmative action programs. Title VII has an ‘equal opportunity clause’ which 
states: 
 
‘It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
 
(1) to fail or to refuse hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
 
or 
 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affected his status as an employee, because of such individual`s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ 
 
In a South African context, the EEA, similarly to the Constitution, as discussed before, 
also recognizes the fact that apartheid disadvantaged certain categories of people. Hence 
the Preamble of the EEA states: 
 
           ‘Recognising –  
that as a result of apartheid and other discriminatory laws and 
practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation and income 
within the labour market; and that those disparities create such 
pronounced disadvantages for certain categories of people that they 
cannot be redressed simply by repealing discriminatory laws,  
 
Therefore, in order to –  
 
promote the constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true 
democracy; eliminate unfair discrimination in employment; ensure the 
implementation of employment equity to redress the effects of 
discrimination; achieve a diverse workforce broadly representative of 
our people; promote economic development and efficiency in the 
workplace; and give effect to the obligations of the Republic as a 
member of the International Labour Organisation,... .’ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Civil Rights Act of 1964 s 703(a)(1); 703(a)(2). 
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Although the courts in America directed that the implementation of affirmative action 
should be reasonable, the Court in Detroit Police Officers’ Association v Young166 
encouraged authorities to apply affirmative action measures by stating: ‘Moreover, the 
Constitution imposes on states a duty to take affirmative action steps to eliminate the 
continuing effects of past discrimination.’ 
 
It follows that although Title VII prohibits discrimination, it does not impose a statutory 
duty on employers to implement affirmative action as opposed to the EEA. Section 
706(g)(1) of Title VII empowers the courts to ensure the application of affirmative action 
as a remedy for non-compliance.    
 
Therefore, it is submitted that the state and private employers in America are not obliged 
to take positive action with regard to affirmative action. It follows that attention is only 
drawn towards affirmative action when a person who feels wronged by affirmative action 
programs approaches the court. 
 
Given the above it is evident that both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the EEA have 
envisaged equality in the workplace. However, the inference which can be drawn from 
Title VII is that it envisaged formal equality whilst the EEA and the Constitution of South 
Africa envisage equality of outcome (substantive equality). 
 
 
3.3 Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action 
 
It is obvious that affirmative measures in America as well as in South Africa were aimed 
to advance blacks e.g. the minority in America and the majority in South Africa. The 
inference drawn is that affirmative action was not based on the social status of a person 
but rather on a particular race group, but also women and people with disabilities 
(irrespective of race). 
 
Although Title VII does not name any particular race group but refers to minorities, 
inclusive of women, it is safe to conclude that it strived to advance blacks as they 
represents the minority in the US.
167
  
 
‘Minorities’ in the US are define as: 
 
‘Blacks, Hispanics, American Indian or Alaskan Native and Asian or Pacific 
 Islander,’ and ‘Black’ is defined as ‘(not of Hispanic origin) all persons 
 having origins in any of the Black racial groups of Africa.’168   
 
The definition of ‘minorities’ in terms of Title VII is not inclusive of coloureds, as is the 
situation in South Africa, where the EEA in s 1 defines ‘designated groups’ with specific 
reference to Black people as inclusive of Africans, Coloureds and Indians.  
                                                 
166 608 F 2d 671 694 (1979). 
167 Executive Order 11246. Issued in1965. 
168 Title VII – Form EEO – 1. See EEOC Standard Form 100 s 4 of the Appendix. 
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It follows that in terms of the equal protection clause people of foreign origin also qualify 
to benefit from affirmative measures designed for minority groups, unlike in South Africa 
where only citizens are deemed to be the beneficiaries.
169
 
 
The effect is that white people as well as all males of any origin qualify for protection 
under Title VII.
170
 Hence, ss 2(a) and (b) of the EEA are more explicit with regard to who 
is entitled to equal opportunity and state: 
 
‘The purpose of the Act is to achieve equity in the workplace by – (a) promoting 
 equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of 
 unfair discrimination; and (b) implementing affirmative action measures to 
 redress the disadvantages in the employment experienced by designated groups, 
 in order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational categories 
 and levels in the workforce’ (own emphasis). 
 
The definition of ‘minorities’ in terms of Title VII does not include people with 
disabilities, whilst the term ‘designated groups’ in terms of the EEA is inclusive of people 
with disabilities. Equality for disabled people in the US is covered under a separate 
law.
171
 
 
The difference in the affirmative action policies of America and South Africa is clearly 
demonstrated by the case of Regents of the University of California v Bakke.
172
 In this 
case the University set aside 16 out of 100 places exclusively for racial minority 
applicants. The plaintiff scored the highest number of points of any of the students 
admitted under the programme.  
 
The plaintiff argued that the University`s refusal to admit him to the Medical School was 
based on race and subsequently discriminated against him and that this constituted a 
violation of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. The Court 
in Bakke was of the view that the equal protection clause required that the same 
protection be given to every person regardless of race. The Court further held that racial 
and ethnic distinctions are inherently suspect and need the strict scrutiny test.  
 
The Court noted as follows: 
 
‘Courts may be asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual 
 members of a particular group in order to advance the group’s 
 general interest ... Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion 
 that individuals  may be asked to suffer otherwise permissible burdens 
 in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups ... 
                                                 
169 Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC) 69 ‘The only persons to whom 
      it should legitimately and fairly be directed therefore, are persons previously and directly      
      disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in the South African context.’ 
170 Title VII – Form EEO – 1. 
171 Disabilities Act of 1990. 
172 98 S Ct 2733 (1978). 
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 [p]referential programs may only be reinforce common stereotypes 
 holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without 
 special protection based on a factor having no relationship to 
 individual worth.’173  
 
The Supreme Court noted further with regard to the individualistic notion of equal 
protection: 
‘...[i]t is the individual who is entitled to judicial protections 
againstclassifications based upon his racial or ethnic background 
because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather than 
the   individual only because of his membership in a particular group 
...’174 
 
It follows that in terms of the equal protection clause an affirmative action plan has to 
pass the strict scrutiny test to be constitutional. In other words a compelling interest has 
to be proved of past discrimination against a specific group as well as of individual 
discrimination.
175
  
 
In terms of the EEA, however, an affirmative action plan will only pass constitutional 
muster if it complies with s 9(2) of the Constitution. The view in Bakke was supported in 
the Adarand
176
 case in which Judge O`Connor, for the majority, noted that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments support individuals and not groups. Therefore, it follows that 
any government action which has an element of race should be subjected to strict scrutiny 
to ensure that the individual’s right is not violated. 
 
In contrast to the Bakke case, the same principles in a South African context were also 
expounded in Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & Others.
177
 In this case as 
previously stated, a black police officer was appointed over his white colleague who 
received the highest percentage mark during the interview. The applicant accordingly 
claimed unfair discrimination in terms of s 9(3) of the Constitution.
178
 This is similar to 
what Bakke claimed in terms of the equal protection clause.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 98 S Ct 2733 (1978) 2748. 
174 98 S Ct 2733 (1978) 2753. 
175 McGregor M ‘The Application of Affirmative Action in Employment law with specific reference to the 
     Beneficiaries: A Comparative Study’ (unpublished LLD thesis, Unisa, 2005) 242. 
176 Adarand Constructors v Pena115 S Ct 2097 (1995). 
177 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
178 ‘The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
     grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
     orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.’ 
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Unlike the Bakke judgment, the Court in Stoman held that discrimination on the grounds 
listed in s 9(3) of the Constitution was regarded as unfair unless it was established that 
the discrimination was fair.
179
 The dispute was about an allegation of discrimination 
based on race and there was the presumption that it was indeed unfair unless the 
respondent can prove it was fair. The court noted further that the Constitution recognizes 
the principle of substantive equality along with that of formal quality.  
 
In other words the Court in Stoman accepted that actions needed to be taken to ensure the 
advancement of persons or categories of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. It is accordingly submitted that the court sanctioned affirmative action 
measures to address South Africa’s deep-rooted history of racial and systemic 
discrimination.  
 
It is obvious, as previously stated, that the equal protection clause has formal equality in 
mind as opposed to the South African Constitution’s s 9(2) and the EEA’s s 6(2) which 
embrace substantive equality. It is furthermore important to note that whilst the equal 
protection clause caters for individual rights, affirmative action in South Africa provides 
protection to the group. The principle the Supreme Court applied in the Bakke case is that 
no person should be prejudiced during processes adopted in an attempt to advance 
another. The South African Constitution as well as the EEA is in direct conflict with that 
approach as it provides for direct (fair) discrimination to ensure that the imbalances of the 
past are corrected.
180
   
 
The Court in Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security emphasized the collective nature 
of affirmative action: 
 
‘The emphasis is certainly on the group or category of persons, of which the 
 particular individual happens to be a member, or, more starkly put in the 
 negative, of which a specific person such as the applicant in this case is not a 
 member. This group has been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The aim is 
 not to reward the fourth respondent as an individual but to advance the category 
 of persons to which he belongs and to achieve substantive equality in the SAPS 
 as an important component of the South African society.’ 181 
 
Whilst the ideals of the Constitution and the EEA are to redress past imbalances, Judge 
Powell in the Bakke case was unwilling to deal with the question of past prejudice and 
noted as follows: 
 
‘The concepts of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ necessarily reflect temporary 
 arrangements and political judgements. ...the white “majority” itself is composed 
 of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior 
 discrimination at the hands of the state and private individuals.  
                                                 
179 The Constitution s 9(5) ‘Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is 
      unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.’ 
180 Constitution s 9(2) and the EEA s 6(2). 
181 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T) 1035. 
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Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding 
judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then 
the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants.’182 
 
Given the above, it is evident that the American philosophy of affirmative action is based 
on the promotion of equality between the different race groups, as opposed to the 
enforcement of the constitutional values of human beings as enshrined in the South 
African Constitution.
183
 It is also important to note the remarks of Judge Blackmun in his 
dissenting judgment in the Stotts case in which he explains the difficulty of having a 
racially neutral affirmative action plan. He noted that ‘in order to get beyond racism, we 
must first take account of race. There is no other way’.184 
 
Judge Blackmun also warned that the Court cannot allow the equal protection clause to 
perpetuate racial supremacy and noted that to ‘treat some persons equally, we must treat 
them differently’. 185  
 
Hence it is submitted that Judge Blackmun’s remarks are consistent with the principles as 
set out in the EEA to ensure equality of outcome. In terms of the EEA employers are 
obligated to comply with s 15 in ensuring that sufficient steps are taken to level the 
playing fields. A failure to comply with the provisions of the EEA is punishable with a 
sanction imposed by the Director–General of Labour as will be discussed below. 
 
In having regard to the above, affirmative action plans came under scrutiny in the Weber 
186
 case. The majority was of the opinion that Title VII granted ‘equality of opportunity’, 
and the advancement of one person should not be to the detriment of another. The Court 
in Weber came to three conclusions. First, the legitimate expectations of white people 
should not be trammelled, no white person should be retrenched and replaced by a black 
person, and whites should not be prevented from advancement. Secondly, there should be 
a cut-off date for the advancement of those catered for in   the affirmative action plan and 
it should only continue until the problem is addressed. Thirdly, the plan should be 
flexible, must not contain fixed percentages (quotas) of minorities as beneficiaries to 
rectify the problem, but just utilize sufficient minorities to address the racial 
imbalances.
187
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
182 98 S Ct 2733 (1978) 2751-2. 
183 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
      Grondwetlikheid’ (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University 2004) 67. 
184 104 S Ct 2576 (1984) 2807. 
185 104 S Ct 2576 (1984) 2807. 
186 United States Steelworkers v Weber 99 S Ct 2721 (1979). 
187 99 S Ct 2731 (1979). 
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In contrast to the ruling in Weber, the South African Constitution as well as the EEA do 
not make provision for a cut-off date and have strong indicators as to how redress should 
be achieved.
188
 As opposed to Weber, in terms of the EEA, white males as a group, 
regardless of the fact whether an individual benefitted from the apartheid system or not, 
are excluded from any express benefit of affirmative action programmes.
189
 On the other 
hand, s 15(4) of the EEA prohibits any employer from implementing employment 
practices which could establish an absolute barrier to the advancement of people who are 
excluded from the designated groups.  
 
It should be noted that in terms of Title VII, court interference is only possible if an 
employer intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
190
 In terms of the 
South African Constitution the determination of the existence of discrimination is an 
objective enquiry and motive or intent is not relevant.
191
 
 
Title VII also provides that employers could determine their own merit standards in 
developing an ability test and act upon the results thereof, as long as the actions are not 
meant to discriminate. However, the Court in Local 28
192
 noted that it cannot interfere if 
the individual is denied an opportunity on the ground that he is unqualified. The latter is 
in line with South African jurisprudence that the appointment of a ‘wholly unqualified’ or 
less than suitably qualified or incapable person in a responsible position could never be 
justified.
193
 Given the fact that affirmative action is controversial, the opponents thereof 
would argue that such programs will allow for ‘unqualified’ or ‘less qualified’ people to 
be appointed and for qualified or better qualified people to be ignored. The tests which 
were applied to determine competency of minority groups were found culturally biased 
and might be regarded as an employment barrier.
194
  
 
The effect, if the above is true, is that the practice will leave the door open for abuse by 
employers as an excuse not to implement affirmative action. To ensure the effective 
implementation of affirmative action, it is suggested that a merit test should at least 
determine the best candidate among members of the minority groups. The latter was also 
the view of the Court in IMAWU 
195
 in which the Labour Court noted ‘that in the event 
members of the ‘designated group’ compete with another that the best possible candidate 
from that group should be appointed’. The EEA, contrary to Title VII, is very explicit as 
to who is eligible for preferential treatment in terms of designated groups. Thus as 
indicated before, the EEA in s 20(3) defined ‘suitably qualified’ people who needs to be 
considered by the employer to redress the imbalances. 
 
                                                 
188 Section 15 read with s 20 of the EEA. 
189 EEA s 1. 
190 Section 706(g). 
191 (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC) 322; City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) 278. 
192 Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v EEOC 106 S Ct 3019 (1986). 
193 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
194 Du Toit D ‘et el’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 645. 
195 (2000) 21 ILJ 1119 (LC). 
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To ensure that the above is complied with, s 42(a) of the EEA makes provision that the 
Director–General of Labour should supervise the affirmative programs of employers and 
must take into account factors which include but are not limited to, 
  
‘The extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different designated 
 groups are equitably represented within each occupational category and level in that 
 employer`s workforce in the relation to the - ... .’ (own emphasis) 
 
As stated before, the EEA, unlike Title VII, does not leave any escape route for 
employers not to advance people of the ‘designated groups’. Given the above it is 
submitted that affirmative action programmes are based on a needs principle and that the 
beneficiaries thereof deserve compensation as they were prejudiced in the past.
196
 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In essence then, in assessing the use of affirmative action processes by both America and 
South Africa, it is evident that affirmative action in the US is subjected to a sunset clause 
as opposed to the EEA which presumes affirmative action as a value (permanent). There 
is no doubt that the processes in both the US, which focus on the minority and South 
Africa, which focus on the majority (designated groups), are directed to ensure equitable 
representation in the workplace. 
 
However, the distinct difference is that affirmative action in the US follows an 
individualistic approach as opposed to the EEA which embraces a group approach.
197
 The 
processes in both countries will only be regarded as legitimate if they are included in an 
affirmative action plan.
198
 
 
 
3.5 Affirmative Action in Namibia 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
Before independence in 1990 Namibia was governed by the then South African apartheid 
regime. As a result the resemblance of Namibia`s labour laws to those of South Africa is 
notable.
199
 New labour laws were enacted after the adoption of Namibia’s Constitution.200 
It goes without saying that, similar to what the situation was in South Africa, blacks were 
employed on fixed term contracts and their movements and choice of jobs were legally 
restricted.
201
 
                                                 
196 Smith N ‘Affirmative Action: Its Origin and Point’ (1992) 243. 
197 98 S Ct 2733 (1978) 2753. See also Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T) 
    1035. 
198 99 S Ct 2721 (1979). See also Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety and Security (2003) 24 ILJ 163 
     (LC). 
199 Fenwick C ‘Labour Law in Namibia: Towards an ‘Indigenous Solution’? (2005) 4. 
200 Fenwick C (2005) 10. 
201 Fenwick C (2005) 4. 
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Following the transition in 1990, the new Namibian government reconstructed its labour 
legislation to comply with international practices as envisaged by the ILO.
202
 To have an 
understanding of how affirmative action in Namibia compares with that of South Africa, 
the relevant legislation in this regard needs to be discussed.  
 
Affirmative action law in both South Africa
203
 and Namibia
204
 is still in a process of 
development and limited information is available. It is clear from the legislation that 
much similarity exists between the two country’s affirmative action laws but there are 
also various dissimilarities.
205
 Dissimilarities are that South Africa’s Act refers to 
‘Employment Equity’ whilst Namibia`s Act refer directly to ‘Affirmative Action’. The 
difference in focus of affirmative action in South Africa and Namibia to that in the 
United States of America is that in the US, affirmative action is directed to the minority 
whilst in South Africa and Namibia the focus is on the majority. Both South Africa and 
Namibia were previously governed by the minority, with the majority initially oppressed, 
later being elected into power after the respective transitions. For the purpose of this 
thesis the focus will be on the relevant legislation and legal principles. 
 
 
3.5.2 Comparison of Legislation 
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Namibian Affirmative Action Act (and the EEA
206
 in 
a South African context), makes provision for the establishment of an Employment 
Equity Commission (EEC).
207
 Section 4 of the Namibian Act states: The objectives of the 
Commission are - 
 
(a) ‘To enquire into whether a relevant employer has adopted and is implementing 
 an affirmative action plan and whether any particular affirmative action plan or 
 affirmative action measure meets the objects of this Act, and to take the actions 
 prescribed by or under this Act in regard thereto; 
(b) To collect and compile information for the purposes of the administration of the 
provisions of this Act; 
(c) To advise any person, body, institution, organisation, or interest group on matters 
pertaining to the objects of this Act, including whether an existing or proposed 
affirmative action measure or employment practice is consistent with the objects 
of this Act; 
                                                 
202 Musukubili F ‘A Comparison of the South African and Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution System’ 
     (unpublished LLM thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2009) 1. 
203 The EEA. 
204 Namibian Affirmative Action (Employment) Act, 29 of 1998. 
205 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
      Grondwetlikheid’ (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 164. 
206 Section 28, Commission for Employment Equity. 
207 Section 4 of Act 29 of 1998. 
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(d) To advise the Minister on making regulations in order to achieve the objects of 
this Act and on any other matter the Minister may refer to the Commission; 
(e) To undertake or sponsor research and publications relating to the objects of this 
Act and the Commission`s functions; and 
(f) To exercise such other powers or perform such other duties and functions as 
many or is required to be performed or exercised by the Commission under this 
Act.’ 
The EEA, although providing for a Commission for Employment Equity (CEE),
208
 the 
Director-General of Labour 
209
 (as will be discussed in chapter 4) is empowered to fulfil 
the functions similar to those of the EEC. From the Preamble of the Namibian 
Affirmative Action Act, it is clear that it is focus on developing rules and regulations to 
ensure equal opportunities for designated groups and a justifiable representivity in the 
workforce.  
 
Hence the Preamble states: 
 
‘To achieve equal opportunity in employment in accordance with Article 10 and 
  Article 23 of the Namibian Constitution; to provide for the establishment of the 
 Employment Equity Commission; to redress through appropriate affirmative 
 action plans the conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by 
 persons in designated groups arising from past discriminatory laws and 
 practices; to institute procedure to contribute towards the elimination of 
 discrimination in employment; and to provide for matters incidental thereto.’ 
 
The Preamble of the EEA as discussed before (para 3.2 above) has similar objectives. It 
is, therefore, submitted that both Preambles are directed to achieve equal representation 
and eliminate discrimination in the workplace. The Namibian Act defines affirmative 
action in s 17 as:  
 
‘measures designed to ensure that persons in designated groups enjoy 
 equal employment opportunities at all levels of employment and are 
 equitably represented in the workforce of a relevant employer.’ (own 
 emphasis) 
 
It goes on to include, among other things, the following very important obligations under 
s 17(2): 
 
(a) ‘identification and elimination of employment barriers against persons 
in designated groups; 
(b) making reasonable efforts in the workplace to accommodate, 
physically or otherwise, persons with disabilities; and 
                                                 
208 Chapter IV s 28 of the EEA. 
209 Section 42 of the EEA. 
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(c) instituting positive measures to further the employment opportunities 
for persons in designated groups, which may include measures such 
as:- 
 
(i) ensuring that existing training programmes contribute to 
furthering the objects of this Act; 
(ii) establishing new training programmes aimed at furthering the 
objects of this Act; and 
(iii) giving preferential treatment in employment decisions to 
suitably qualified persons from designated groups to ensure 
that such persons are equitably represented in the workforce of 
the relevant employer.’ 
Although the EEA does not, strictly speaking, define ‘affirmative action’, ss 15(1) and (2) 
of the EEA relate to s 17 of the Namibian Affirmative Action Act, in stating: 
 
‘(1) Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that 
       suitably qualified people from designated groups have equal 
       employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
       occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated 
       employer, 
(2) Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer 
      must include: (a)  measures to identify and eliminate employment 
      barriers, including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect 
      people from designated groups; (b) measures designed to further      
      diversity in the workplace based on equal dignity and respect of all       
      people; (c) making reasonable accommodation for people from 
      designated groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal 
      opportunities and are equitably represented in the workforce of a  
      designated employer;  
(d) … measures to: (i) ensure the equitable representation of suitably 
      qualified people from designated groups in all occupational categories 
      and levels in the workforce; and (ii) retain and develop people from 
      designated groups and to implement appropriate training measures, 
      including measures in terms of an Act of Parliament providing for 
      skills development.’ 
 
From the above, very few differences between the Namibian Act and the EEA are 
evident, such as the EEC
210
 serving as an enforcing tool, similar to the function of the 
Director-General of Labour in terms of the EEA.
211
  
                                                 
210 Section 5 of the Namibian Act. 
211 See Chapter 4. 
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3.5.3 Definitions 
 
In determining the similarities and dissimilarities between Namibia’s and South Africa’s 
labour laws, the following definitions of the Namibian legislation will be discussed: 
Relevant employer, Designated groups, Employment barriers, Suitably qualified person, 
Employee and Disabilities. 
 
(a) The relevant employer 
 
The term ‘relevant employer’ used in the Namibian Act is similar to that used in the 
EEA, i.e. the ‘designated employer’. However, s 20 of the Namibian Act stipulates that 
the Minister of Labour will identify the employers who have to comply with the Act. 
These employers must be named individually or be identified by category.  
 
The criteria used to identify a ‘relevant employer’ include numerical levels, industrial or 
economic sectors, and any other principles or standards deemed appropriate by the 
Minister. The ‘designated employer’ in terms of the EEA is determined by means of 
objective criteria, unlike the ‘relevant employer’ that is determined in a subjective 
manner.
212
 A ‘designated employer’ in terms of s 1 of the EEA means:  
 
- ‘an employer who employs 50 or more employees; an employer, who 
employs fewer than 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that is 
equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business in 
terms of Schedule 4 to this Act, 
- a municipality as referred to in Chapter 7 of the Constitution; an organ of 
state as defined in section 239 of the Constitution, but excluding local 
spheres of government,  
- the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the 
South African Secret Service;  
- and an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 
31 of the Labour Relations Act, which appoints it as a designated 
employer in terms of this Act, to the extent provided for in the agreement.’ 
In the event that the status of the relevant employer should change, the employer is 
responsible to report such change to the Namibian EEC. In terms of Government Notice 
(GN) No. 159 of 1999, no relevant employer shall cease to exist to be a relevant employer 
as a result of the reduction in the number of employees in the employ of the relevant 
employer to less than 50.
213
  
                                                 
212 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende  Studie na 
      Grondwetlikheid’ (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 192. 
213 Article 3(3) of the regulations of the Namibian Affirmative Action Act as published in the Namibian 
     Government Gazette 158 of 199 and Government Notice 159 of 06 August 1999. 
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The effect of the GN is it compels private sector (relevant) employers to ensure that their 
affirmative action reports should be submitted no later than 18 months after the date it is 
published.
214
 The EEA of South Africa has no similar provision and it is not clear what 
the situation is going to be if the employer`s status has changed. The Namibian Act, s 22 
also provides for any employer who is not a relevant employer to adopt and implement a 
voluntary affirmative action plan which is consistent with the Act. Unlike the Namibian 
Act, the EEA makes no provision for voluntary affirmative action plans. 
 
(b) Designated groups  
 
Section 18 of the Namibian Act, refers to three groups whose members are to benefit 
from affirmative action measure, viz (1) racially disadvantaged persons; (2) women 
(irrespective of race); and (3) persons with disabilities (physical or mental limitations 
irrespective of race or gender). ‘Designated groups’ in terms of the EEA means black 
people, women and people with disabilities. Black people are further defined by the EEA 
to be inclusive of Africans, Coloureds and Indians. The similarity between the two 
definitions is that both make provision for women and people with disabilities. It is 
submitted that both instances include women of all races.  
 
However, the term ‘racially disadvantaged groups’ in the Namibian Act, includes all 
races, having regard to their social, economic, or educational imbalances which arose 
from the racially discriminatory laws which existed before Namibia became 
independent.
215
 
 
It follows that ‘white’ males in terms of the Namibian Act, unlike in South Africa, are 
also entitled to benefit from affirmative action measures if they can prove that they fell 
victim to the discriminatory laws of the past. In South Africa all white males, irrespective 
of whether they were born before or after 1994 and regardless of their social status, are 
excluded from affirmative action measures.
216
 Section 19 of the Namibian Act excludes 
only non-Namibians from the benefits of affirmative action measures.  
 
In terms of s 19(3) a relevant employer must train a Namibian citizen as the understudy 
for every non-Namibian citizen in its employment. An employer who wants to retain a 
non-Namibian citizen as a permanent employee must apply for exemption to the Minister 
of Labour. Non-Namibians with permanent residence rights are included in the 
affirmative action provisions applicable to Namibian citizens. Although the EEA does not 
discriminate against non-South Africans directly in terms of its definition, it was 
determined that affirmative action measures cater only for South African citizens.
217
 It is 
clear that both the Namibian Act as well as the EEA give employment preference to their 
own citizens. It is submitted, that this principle is an acceptable one as any government is 
first and foremost responsible to address the needs of its own citizens. 
                                                 
214 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 36. 
215 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 24. 
216 Article 1 of the EEA. 
217 (2001) 22 ILJ 2647 (LAC) 2656 (E). 
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In a South African context, as stated earlier, not all white males benefitted from 
apartheid. This is evident in the growing unemployment of white males and the increase 
in the occupation of informal housing by white families.
218
 Therefore, it is hoped that 
South Africa, with its growing unemployment and the fact that the current provisions of 
the EEA (designated groups) excludes all white males (which could result in another 
minority disadvantaged group) should consider the Namibian approach. Although s 15(4) 
of the EEA prohibits any designated employer from establishing employment practices 
which creates an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or 
advancement of people who are not from disadvantaged groups, the fact remains that 
white males are effectively, and will never be, beneficiaries of affirmative action.
219
 
 
It is, therefore, submitted that if South Africa does not amend the EEA it would create 
another minority disadvantaged group instead of levelling the playing fields. The 
Namibian Act is plausible in that the benefits of affirmative action are based on whether 
or not a person has suffered from past discriminatory laws, and that race is not the 
determining factor.  
 
 
(c) Employment barrier 
 
An employment barrier in terms of s 1 of the Namibian Act ‘means any rule, practice or 
condition, other than a legitimate job requirement, which adversely affects persons who 
are members of a designated group more than it affects persons who are not members of 
such designated group’. ‘Employment barrier’ is not defined in the EEA. It relates to the 
definition of ‘employment policy or practice’ in terms of s 1 read with s 2 of the EEA, 
which includes the achievement of equity in the workplace by ‘(a) promoting equal 
opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination; and (b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the 
disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their 
equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace’.  
 
It follows then, that any employment practice or policy which prevents the advancement 
of black people, women and people with disabilities would be perceived as a barrier. The 
imposition of inappropriate language or educational requirements may also be regarded 
as a barrier.
220
 It is submitted that the intention of both definitions is to remove all 
obstacles that could prevent the empowerment of employees.
221
 
 
 
 
                                                 
218 I Luv South South Africa ‘Zuma visits white squatter camps’ available at 
      http://iluvsa.blogspot.com/2008/07/zuma-visits-white-squatter-camps.html (accessed 21 May 2012). 
     ‘Not only do we have more black poor, we have new white poor. Instead, through terrible policies we 
      chased away our talented people, creating more unemployment then shutting out an entire race 
      group from job opportunities. Fourteen years later, the place is a mess.’ 
219 Gibson E ‘SAL se kadetprogram aanvaar nie wit mans vir opleiding’ Die Burger 17 Augustus 2012 4. 
220 Du Toit D ‘et al’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 645. 
221 Section 15(4) of the EEA. 
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(d) Suitably qualified person 
 
Section 1 of the Namibian Act defines a suitably qualified person as a ‘person who has 
the abilities, formal qualifications or relevant experience for a position of employment’. 
Similarly s 20(3) of the EEA also defines ‘suitably qualified person’ as ‘a person who 
may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of anyone of, or any combination of that 
person`s- (a) formal qualifications; (b) prior learning; (c) relevant experience; or (c) 
capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job’.  
 
It follows that in determining whether a person is suitable to be employed and/or 
promoted the employer must consider the aforementioned. It follows further that the 
employer is obligated to comply with the above and, failing such, he should substantiate 
such decision.  
 
The difference between the two definitions is that the Namibian definition makes no 
provision for a person to acquire the necessary capacity within a reasonable time. In 
regard to the EEA definition an employer cannot discriminate against a person only on 
the ground that the employee lacks experience.
222
 It is submitted that the only exception 
to the rule is in terms of Art.1(2) of the ILO Convention No. 111 of 1958
223
 which states 
that ‘any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the 
inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination’. 
(e) Employee 
An employee who is entitled to benefit from affirmative action measures is defined in s 1 
of the Namibian Labour Act to be ‘any natural person: (a) who is employed by, or 
working for, any employer and who is receiving, or entitled to receive, any remuneration; 
or (b) who in any manner assists in the carrying on or the conducting of the business of 
an employer’. 
In terms of the EEA ‘employee’ ‘means any person other than an independent contractor 
who- (a) works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to 
receive, any remuneration; and (b) in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer, and ‘employed’ and ‘employment’ have corresponding 
meanings’. The only difference between the two definitions is that the EEA refers to any 
person ‘other than an independent contractor’.  
(f) Disabilities 
Section 18(b) of the Namibian Act defines ‘disabilities’ ‘in relation to a person, includes 
any persistent physical or mental limitation which restricts such person’s preparation for, 
entry into or participation or advancement in, employment or occupation’.  
                                                 
222 Section 20(5) of the EEA. 
223 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation No.111 of the 
     International Labour Organization, 1958. See also s 6(2)(b) of the EEA. 
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In terms of s 1 of the EEA ‘people with disabilities’ are defined as those who have a 
long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment, which substantially limits their 
prospects of entry into, or advancement in employment. In essence the two definitions are 
the same to ensure equal opportunity to that particular group. 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
In the light of the above, it is evident that the similarities between the EEA and the 
Namibian Act are overwhelming compared to the differences. The fundamental 
difference is that the Namibian Act in its attempt to rectify imbalances has a strong focus 
on the social status of individuals, as opposed to the EEA which is directed to particular 
race groups (designated groups) regardless of whether or not a particular individual was 
the victim of past prejudice.  The monitoring and enforcement of affirmative action 
measures will be discussed in chapter 4 hereafter. 
 
3.6 International Law 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are found in international law 
instruments such as treaties, international conventions, and declarations.
224
 From many of 
these instruments, it follows that every citizen has fundamental rights which obliges 
(member) states to take proactive steps to protect it.
225
  
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Race Convention) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (Women’s Convention) emanated from the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights respectively.
226
 In 
essence, then, these international instruments provide the foundation of affirmative action 
to remedy the effects of discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 Interim Report on Group and Human Rights 5. 
225 McGregor M ‘Affirmative action and non-discrimination: South African law evaluated against 
     international law’ (2006) 386. 
226 Cohn M ‘Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: United States 
     ‘Violation of Its International Obligations’ (2002) 250. 
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3.6.2 The UN Charter 
During South Africa’s transition, the interim227 and current Constitutions228 were enacted 
in a manner to comply with international law on human rights. The UN Charter (the 
Charter) is inclusive of all the major principles of international relations. The Charter 
subscribes to the following:
229
 
‘WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,  
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,  
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women and of the nations large and small, and 
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
 from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained,  
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom... 
AND FOR THESE ENDS 
....to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples.... 
The Charter also seeks:
230
 
           ‘[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an   
            economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and ... promoting and 
            encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
            without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ...’ 
It follows that the various states, inclusive of South Africa have to pledge adherence to 
these principles, to promote respect for them, and in the event of their transgression, to 
take action jointly and severely in conjunction with the UN to ensure world peace.
231
  
                                                 
227 Interim Constitution of South Africa, Act, 2000 of 1993 s 8(3).  
228 Section 9(2). 
229 Preamble; Chapter 1, Article 1(1). 
230 Chapter 1, Article 1(3). 
231 McGregor M ‘The Application of Affirmative Action and non-discrimination: South African law 
     evaluated against international law’ (2006) 386. 
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It is suggested that the Charter should be read with the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the USA, which prohibits discrimination.  
The Charter presumed equal treatment of all irrespective of race, sex, gender, and that all 
peoples were entitled to the benefits of affirmative action. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
232
 is in this respect 
equally relevant as it empowers people to develop their own economy and to be self- 
sustainable,
233
 followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which 
compels states to allow citizens to exercise their individual rights. 
Having regard to the above Covenants and the Charter in respect of individual rights, the 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
234
 in 
pursuance of equal rights requires states to implement affirmative action measures to 
address all forms of racial discrimination.
235
 
It does not imply that all people, at all relevant times, will be treated equally. To ensure 
the elimination of racial discrimination and equal treatment, certain people need to be 
treated differently, which is the view of Judge Blackmun in his dissenting judgment in 
the Bakke case as discussed earlier. Judge Blackmun is also of the view that race is a 
determining factor when dealing with racial discrimination.
236
 
 
3.6.3 The Race Convention 
 
The above principles of affirmative action are also embodied in Art.1 of the Race 
Convention which states: 
 
‘Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement 
 of certain racial or ethnical groups or individuals requiring such protection as 
 may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment 
 or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed 
 racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
 consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial 
 groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they 
 were taken have been achieved.’237 (own emphasis) 
 
                                                 
232 Adopted in 1966. The objective is to force governments provide societal rights to all people in a society. 
233 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende 
     Studie na Grondwetlikheid’ (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 268. 
234 Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the UN on 20 November 1963 and adopted in 1965. 
235 Cohn M ‘Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: United States 
     ‘Violation of Its International Obligations’ (2002) 251. 
236 104 S Ct 2576 (1984) 2807. 
237 Articles 1(4) ‘This Convention provides the basis for future tests as to the acceptability of such 
     measures. It includes notions of necessity and proportionality to the aims to be achieved as well as the 
     time limits.’ 
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Although the EEA embraces the principles as set out in chapter 2 above, it appears to be 
in conflict with two issues: first, the EEA is specifically directed in respect of ‘black’ 
with regard to race and limits the rights of ‘white males’ to equally participating for 
employment; and secondly, Art. 1 of the Race Convention presumed the demolition of 
affirmative action when it achieved its objective, whilst affirmative action in South 
Africa is currently of a permanent nature.  
 
The Race Convention also states that ‘reservations’ incompatible with its purpose and 
objective will be void.
238
 It follows then that the EEA’s definition in s 1239 with regard to 
‘designated groups’ could be in conflict with the Convention’s objective and purpose. 
However, in defence of South Africa’s ‘reservation’ for the ‘designated groups’, it can be 
argued that it is the only manner in which equality would be achieved as members of that 
group were the victims of past discrimination. Therefore, the Constitution expressly 
states that a measure designed to eliminate past discrimination is not in itself unfair.
240
 
 
It is evident from the above that the Race Convention presumed pro-active measures to 
be taken by states against racism, which is compatible with the provisions as contained in 
the Constitution.
241
 In essence the Race Convention is based on three notions: a state 
should prove that its actions were necessary; that the actions are proportional to the 
objective; and should make provision for a time limit.
242
  
 
It is submitted that the reason why the Race Convention is directed to the individual and 
not the group, is to avoid individuals from enjoying the benefits of affirmative action 
because of their membership of a specific group whilst it may be that they as individuals, 
never suffered personal discrimination.
243
 Given the fact that the EEA is of a permanent 
nature, it is submitted that it is therefore in conflict with the notion of temporary 
measures. Unlike the Race Convention, affirmative action in terms of South Africa’s 
Constitution and EEA embraces protection of the group. It is submitted that people who 
did not suffer discrimination during apartheid may also benefit from affirmative action.  
 
It follows, that given the fact, the protection in terms of the EEA is group orientated, 
children (within the designated group) born during 1994 and thereafter who were not 
victims of past discrimination benefit from affirmative action measures even if they are 
from affluent families. In contrast, as indicated before, white males born during 1994 and 
thereafter would be the victims of affirmative action measures, even though they did not 
benefit from the apartheid practices which may lead to a new category of disadvantaged 
minority.   
 
                                                 
238 Cohn M ‘Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: United States 
     ‘Violation of Its International Obligations”’(2002) 252. 
239 EEA s 1 ‘designated group’ means black people, women and people with disabilities; ‘black people’ is 
      a generic term which means African, Coloureds and Indians.’ 
240 Section 9(5). 
241 Articles 1(4): 2(2 of the Race Convention.  
242 Article 1(4) of the Race Convention. 
243 Van Rensburg LJ ‘Regstellende Aksie en die Grondwetlike Waardes ŉ Regsvergelykende Studie na 
     Grondwetlikheid’  (unpublished LLD thesis, North-West University, 2004) 281. 
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3.6.4 The Women Convention 
 
In addition to the Race Convention, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) also require states to take steps to eliminate discrimination. Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR provides: 
 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
 through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
 technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
 progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant  
 by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
 measures.’ 244 
 
Similar requirements are set by Art. 4(1) of the Women Convention: 
 
‘Adoption by State Parties of temporary social measures aimed at accelerating de 
 facto inequality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination 
 as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence 
 the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be 
 discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have 
 been achieved.’ 
 
Following the above, the Women’s Convention is explicit and focuses on various 
provisions to achieve affirmative action which require States Parties to take appropriate 
measures which, among others but not limited to, include: - measures to prevent 
discrimination between the status of women and men; that employment opportunities are 
equal and women are not discriminated against because of pregnancies and family 
responsibilities; that women enjoy full emancipation and choice of marriage. 
 
However, the Women’s Convention similar to the Race Convention, presumed the need 
for temporary measures to achieve its goals. It is submitted that States initiates various 
measures to meet their obligations as set out in the Convention as long as they are 
compatible with its provisions.
245
 Hence, South Africa as a signature to the Convention 
enacted the EEA which addresses the inequalities in respect of women. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
244 Adopted in 1997. 
245 McGregor M ‘The Application of Affirmative Action and non-discrimination: South African law 
     evaluated against international law’ (2006) 389. 
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3.6.5 The International Labour Organization 
 
Having regard to Art’s 1 and 5 of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention
246
 which was adopted by the ILO, it is clear that the ILO favours affirmative 
action.
247
  
 
Article 1 of the Convention states: 
 
‘(1) For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes;- 
 
(a) Any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, 
sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which 
has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or 
treatment in employment or occupation; 
(b) such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment 
or occupation as may be determined by the Member concerned after 
consultation with representative employers’ and workers organizations, 
where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.  
 
(2) Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based 
      on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be 
      discrimination. 
 
(3) For the purpose of this Convention the terms employment and occupation 
      include access to vocational training, access to employment and to particular 
      occupations, and terms and conditions of employment.’ 
 
Article 5 embraces Art. 1 in so far as it pursues the implementation of measures to 
achieve equality and states: 
 
(1) ‘Special measures of protection or assistance provided for in other Conventions 
or Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference shall not 
be deemed to be discrimination. 
(2) Any Member may, after consultation with representative employers’ and workers’ 
organizations, where such exist, determine that other special measures designed 
to meet the particular requirements of persons who, for reasons such as sex, age, 
disablement, family responsibilities or social or cultural status, are generally 
recognised to require special protection or assistance, shall not be deemed to be 
discrimination.’ 
                                                 
246 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention No 111, 1958. 
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Having regard to the above Convention, the EEA, which is the implementation document 
and is provided for by s 9(2) of the Constitution and it complies with the ILO in terms of 
s 1 (definition of designated groups), s 2(a) and (b) as well as s 3 as stated hereinbefore.  
 
Article 1(2) of the Convention, and s 6(2)(b) of the EEA make provision for fair 
discrimination in exceptional circumstances, namely that of inherent requirements of a 
job. The principles as prescribed by the ILO and other Conventions were (as discussed 
above) expounded in PSA obo Karriem v SAPS & Another 
248
 in which the Court found 
that ‘operational requirements’ outweighed employment equity considerations, and is in 
compliance with the provisions of the ILO Convention and the EEA. 
 
The justifiable defence to a claim of unfair discrimination as expounded in Karriem, was 
also discussed in Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead.
249
 In this case the Court concluded 
that ‘inherent’ meant an ‘indispensable attribute’ which relates to an inescapable way to 
perform the job.
250
 A matter of urgency or a commercial rationale would not pass 
constitutional muster.
251
 In terms of the ILO Convention any ‘limitation’ in this regard 
must be required by the characteristics of the job and should be in proportion to its 
requirements.
252
  It follows that such an ‘inherent’ requirement should be a permanent 
characteristic of the job.
253
 
 
The effect is that the ILO’s objective is to promote social justice for workers globally, 
which includes the formulation of international policies and programmes, creation of 
international labour standards and provision of technical assistance, education and 
training
254
 Given the representativeness of the ILO, it is submitted, that it provides an 
equal voice to citizens of member states at ILO conferences. 
 
The provisions of the International Conventions are binding on states, which ratified 
them and comply with it accordingly. However, recommendations thereto are not 
binding, but might be morally enforceable to be used to draft guidelines for policy and 
compliance.
255
 The intention of these conventions and recommendations if properly 
implemented is to ensure improvement in the working conditions of workers.
256
 In 
ensuring compliance therewith member states are compelled to report on progress in 
respect of the conventions they ratified.
257
 
 
 
 
                                                 
248 (2007) 4 BLLR 308 (LC). 
249 (2000) 21 ILJ 571 (LAC). 
250 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 835. 
251 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 835. 
252 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation No.111 of the 
      International Labour Organization, 1958. 
253 Cooper C ‘The boundaries of Equality in Labour Law’ (2004) 25 LJ 835. 
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The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
258
 was adopted by the 
ILO and states: 
 
‘... in seeking to maintain the link between social progress and economic growth, 
 the guarantee of fundamental principles and rights at work is of particular 
 significance in that it enables the persons concerned to claim freely and on the 
 basis of equality of opportunity their fair share in the wealth which they have to 
 generate, and to achieve fully their human potential.’ 
 
Given the above, it is submitted that no employment or occupation whether performed by 
nationals or foreigners, is excluded from the content and scope of the ILO Conventions. 
The phrase ‘special measures’ as contained in ILO Convention No.111 (Discrimination 
Convention) serve as bases for affirmative action; hence affirmative action measures in 
terms of the EEA are regarded as not discriminatory.
259
 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that South Africa, in preparing its affirmative 
action measures, considered international conventions. Given the differences in 
affirmative action measures between the US, Namibia and South Africa, it is clear that 
there exists no ‘one size fits all’ measure given the complex nature of the countries.260 
 
In terms of the history of South Africa it appears that affirmative action is a compelling 
measure to ensure equality to all in the workplace.
261
 In essence, then, affirmative action 
is based on a need to address an imbalance.
262
 Therefore, the monitoring, enforcement 
and assessment is essential and will be discussed in chapters 4 hereafter. Although 
Maduro argues that ‘past discriminations do not justify current discriminations between 
individuals that have not themselves benefited or been the object of such 
discrimination’,263 the EEA is aimed to compensate the group regardless whether or not 
the individual was discriminated against in the past.  
 
From the fact that affirmative action is designed to benefit those who were discriminated 
against in the past, it can be postulated that the beneficiaries are receiving compensation 
for past injuries done to them.
264
Among others, International Conventions serve in 
assisting to justify fair discrimination which is contained in the EEA and enabled by the 
South African Constitution.  
                                                 
258 Adopted in 1998. 
259 Art. 5 of the Discrimination Convention.  
260 Groeneveldt D ‘The Truth about Employment Equity’ 
      http://www.ifaisa.org/TheTruthaboutEmploymentEquity.html (accessed 18 May 2012). 
261 Faundez J ‘Promoting Affirmative Action’ (1994) 1187. 
262 Smith N ‘Affirmative Action: Its Origin and point’ (1992) 234. 
263 Madoru M ‘Comparative Perspectives on Equality Law-A view from the United States and the       
     European Union’ (2010) 103. 
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In essence the International Conventions acknowledge different treatment as acceptable 
to ensure equity.
265
 It is thus submitted that affirmative action policies are admissible in 
so far as they do not discriminate. However, to expect that affirmative action would 
instantly solve the severe disadvantages created by apartheid is a myth.
266
 
 
Having regard to the fact that the International Conventions provide that affirmative 
action measures should be of a temporary nature, it therefore appears that the EEA is in 
direct conflict with that objective of these Conventions. Suffice it to say at this stage that 
the success of affirmative action or the failure thereof will depend on the recognition 
thereof as a suitable response, as well as effective communication in all spheres of 
government and the private sector.
267
 It follows that the success of affirmative action can 
also depend on the outcome of measures taken to redress past inequalities, and the result 
is a workforce reflective of the population in which the enterprise operates.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
265 Article 1(4) and 2(2) of the Race Convention and Article 4 of the Women’s Convention. 
266 Faundez J ‘Promoting Affirmative Action’ (1994) 1194. 
267 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ (2000) 14. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE OBLIGATION OF EMPLOYERS TO ENSURE SYSTEMS ARE IN PLACE 
TO ELIMINATE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE, AND AN 
EVALUATION OF THE POWERS OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF 
LABOUR IN TERMS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROMOTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT   
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Having regard to the principles of affirmative action as discussed in the preceding 
chapters, it is imperative to determine whether the legislation and / or regulations, which 
were enacted to ensure equality in the workforce, are sufficient to eliminate unfair 
discrimination. In ensuring the effective compliance with, and implementation of, the 
legislation and regulations, compliance systems will inevitably determine whether the 
goals of affirmative action will be achieved.  
 
Therefore, States which are determined to ensure equality in the workplace have to 
ensure that monitoring systems are in place and that a failure to adhere to legislative 
provisions will have consequences. Given the fact that the Department of Labour is an 
organ of State which is empowered to ensure compliance with the legal provisions as 
enshrined in the Constitution and the EEA, the actions of the Director-General of Labour 
need to be evaluated against, among others, the provisions of the PAJA. In evaluating the 
above, the enforcement systems of the US, Namibia and South Africa will be discussed. 
 
 
4.2 Monitoring and Enforcement Legislation 
 
The South African EEA, The Namibian Affirmative Action Act, and the US Title VII 
(equality opportunity clause) obliged governments and certain employers to ensure 
compliance with national and international affirmative action legislation, as discussed 
hereafter. The EEA, for instance, provides direction and guidelines to designated 
employers and government departments,
268
 enabling them to ensure employment equity 
in the workplace.
269
 To ensure proper ministerial oversight the Commission for 
Employment Equity (CEE)
270
 was established to act in an advisory capacity to the 
Minister of Labour, but does not have any executive powers as such.
271
  
 
                                                 
268 Section 53. 
269 Section 13 read with s15. 
270 Section 28 of the EEA. 
271 Section 30. ‘The Commission advices the Minister among on - (a) Codes of good practice issued by the 
     Minister in terms of section 54; (b) regulations made by the Minister in terms of section 55; and (c) 
     Policy and any other matter concerning this Act.’ 
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The Namibian Employment Equity Commission (EEC), unlike the CEE, has executive 
powers similar to the powers vested in the Director-General of Labour in terms of the 
EEA.
272
 On the other hand the provisions of the International Conventions (ILO) are 
binding on members states, which have to ratified them, comply with it and have to 
report on progress made.
273
 
 
In terms of s 5 of the Namibian Act the main powers of the Commission are to – 
 
- ‘issue guidelines to employers; 
- facilitate training programmes and other technical assistance; 
- appoint review officers; 
- approve, disapprove or conditionally approve affirmative action reports; 
- appoint review panels; 
- issue affirmative action compliance certificates;  
- refer disputes to the Labour Commissioner, and  
- to establish awards recognizing affirmative action achievements.’ 
 
The Director-General of Labour in terms of s 43(1) of the EEA may conduct a review to 
determine whether an employer is complying with the provisions of this Act. In so doing, 
the Director-General may embark on steps in terms of s 43(2) of the Act which states: 
  
‘In order to conduct the review the Director-General may – 
(a) request an employer to submit to the Director-General a copy of its 
current analysis or employment equity plan; 
(b) request an employer to submit to the Director-General any book, record, 
correspondence, document or information that could reasonably be 
relevant to the review of the employer’s compliance with this Act; 
(c) request a meeting with an employer to discuss its employment equity plan, 
the implementation of its plan and any matters related to its compliance 
with this Act;  
or 
(d) request a meeting with any- 
(i) employee or trade union consulted in terms of s16; 
(ii) workplace forum; or 
(iii) other person who may have information relevant to the review.’ 
(own emphasis) 
 
It is suggested that in terms of s 43(2), the Director-General of Labour has a discression 
as he or she may embark on the steps set out therein to ensure that employers comply 
with the provisions of the EEA, by enterrogating their employement equity plans and 
how they implement it in the workplace. The term may creates the impression that the 
Director-General could be selective in its approach, which may have unintended 
consequences as it my be perceived as an abuse of power when these steps are only 
applicable when dealing with selected relevant employers. 
                                                 
272 Chapter V ss 34 - 45. 
273 The ILO 14. 
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In view of the powers and functions of the EEC (Namibia) as well as those of the 
Director-General of Labour (EEA),  it is evident that the respective legislation, despite 
the discretion which the Director-General of Labour may exercise, envisaged compliance 
with affirmative action laws to address inequalities in the workplace. Both institutions are 
responsible to monitor, guides, assist, direct and as last resort sue an employer for non-
compliance.
274
 
 
Although Title VII (US) laid the basis for equality in the workplace, in terms of s 703(j), 
it does not compel employers to implement affirmative action measures. It, furthermore, 
granted employers the right to differentiate between employees with regard to benefits, 
conditions of employment as long as the decision was not based on discrimination in 
terms of race, sex, colour, religion or national origin. Such differentiation could be 
implemented on the basis of the merit system, and could also be justified on the principle 
that the employer had no intention to discriminate.
 
In terms of the South African law, 
intent or motive is irrelevant in the determination of the existence of direct or indirect 
(institutionalised) discrimination as it is an objective inquiry.
275
 In furthering the 
objectives of Title VII’s equal opportunity clause, Executive Order (EO) No 11246 was 
introduced.  
 
The Order aimed to promote equal opportunities for minorities in ensuring that those 
contractors who intend contracting with the State take positive action in eliminating 
employment discrimination.
276
 First, it prohibits discrimination in hiring and employment 
decisions of government contractors as well as subcontractors in terms of the equal 
opportunity clause. In terms of the EO the powers to impose affirmative action 
programmes were vested in the federal Department of Labour which could also issue 
relevant regulations.
277
 Secondly, it encouraged contractors and subcontractors to 
implement affirmative action with regard to ‘qualified’ minorities and women to enhance 
equality in the workplace.  
 
The US established the Office of Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to ensure the 
application of the equal opportunity clause. It was the duty of the OFCCP to ensure that 
each contractor’s contract with government contain an equal opportunity clause in terms 
of EO 11246. In essence, the compliance with the equal employment opportunity clause 
in an employer’s contract with the State makes affirmative action indirectly compulsory, 
similarly to the provisions contained in the EEA. It can be inferred that compliance with 
affirmative action legislation, as discussed above, would result in awards given to the 
relevant employers to encourage the promotion of equal opportunities.  
                                                 
274 Section 45 of the EEA and s 5 of the Namibian Act. 
275 (1998) 1 SA 300 (CC) 54. 
276 Sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2): ‘It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
      to fail or to refuse hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
      individual  with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
      such individual`s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
      employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
      opportunities or otherwise adversely affected his status as an employee, because of such individual`s 
      race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’        
277 Executive Order 11246. 
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It also follows that if employers take effective steps to ensure compliance with the 
legislation, it would undoubtedly result in the awarding of government tenders (State 
contracts).
278
  
 
 
4.3 Duties of Employers 
 
If under-utilisation of women and minorities is experienced, employers (contractors), in 
terms of the OFCCP, are obliged to conduct a self-evaluation to enable them to identify 
and to remove any equal opportunity barriers.
279
 This obligation emanated from the Title 
VII ‘equal opportunity clause’ which envisaged the empowerment of minorities and 
women in the US. It follows that although affirmative action measures are not compelled, 
non-compliance will negatively affect an employer’s application for a State contract. 
 
A relevant employer, in terms of the Namibian Affirmative Action Act, in developing 
and implementing an affirmative action plan,
280
 is required to conduct a statistical 
analysis of its workforce, similarly to the EEA, with regard to the representation of the 
three designated group categories viz, racially disadvantaged persons, women, and 
persons with disabilities.
281
  
 
Every designated employer, in terms of the EEA, must draw up and implement an 
affirmative action plan in order to achieve employment equity for the designated groups 
as set out in chapter III. Section 13(1) states that, ‘every designated employer must, in 
order to achieve employment equity, implement affirmative action measures for people 
from designated groups in terms of this Act’. In order to achieve that, the employer 
should consult with the relevant workplace structures which are in existence in the 
workplace at the time.
282
  
  
Hence, the objective is to create an integrated process, inclusive of the relevant role-
players,
283
 for identifying and removing employment barriers in pursuit of addressing 
equitable representation of suitably qualified persons from the designated groups within 
the workplace.
284
 Notwithstanding the aforementioned, a designated employer is also 
required to ensure, subject to s 42, that no barrier exists which could prevent the 
employment and advancement of people who are not from the designated group.
285
  
 
 
                                                 
278 Section 53 of the EEA. 
279 41 CFR 60-2.10(a). As part of its affirmative action programme, a contractor must monitor and examine 
     its employment decisions and compensation systems in order to evaluate the impact of such systems on 
     women and minorities. 
280 Section 29. 
281 Namibian Act, s 18. 
282 Section 13(2) of the EEA. 
283 Section 16 of the EEA. 
284 Du Toit D ‘et al’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 631. 
285 Section 15(4) of the EEA. 
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To ensure compliance with the plan, the designated employer must also assign one or two 
managers to take responsibility for monitoring and implementing the affirmative action 
measures.
286
 This, however, does not relieve the employer of its responsibility in terms of 
this Act or any other law, as discussed hereafter.
287
 
 
 
4.3.1 Consultation with Employees 
 
The affirmative action plans, as discussed above and further, is subject to proper 
consultation with relevant role-players. Sections 24 of the Namibian Act as well as s 16 
of the EEA make such consultation compulsory. Both provisions are in essence the same 
and require consultation by the employers with employee representatives (unions) with 
regard to the preparation, implementation, revision and monitoring of affirmative action 
plans. In the absence of employee representatives, workplace forums or the employees 
themselves may be directly consulted.  
 
The object of consultation is to reach consensus, similarly to a collective bargaining 
exercise which can serve as a joint problem solving mechanism in the event a dispute 
arises.
288
 It follows that an employer cannot unilaterally prepare and implement an 
affirmative action plan. Neither, can an employer deviate from a properly consulted 
affirmative action plan which was accepted by all relevant parties.
289
 The LC in Dudley 
cautioned against ad hoc appointments and promotions as an employer runs the risk of 
being at odds with a collectively determined equity plan. However, it is submitted that if 
consensus cannot be reached between the parties, the employer retains the right (after 
consultation) to implement the affirmative action plan notwithstanding.
290
  
 
It is further submitted that this is not overly problematic due to the fact that, if any other 
party is aggrieved by the decision of the employer to unilaterally implement the plan, 
they can in terms of s 34 of the EEA report any contravention of the provisions of the Act 
to the Director-General of Labour. In the USA, although the same requirement was not 
explicitly expressed in the Weber
291
 case, the Court interpreted the composition of a 
voluntary affirmative action plan of a private employer.  
 
The plaintiff (Weber) challenged the decision of a private employer who developed in-
house training for crafting, and implemented an affirmative action plan in an attempt to 
address the lack of crafting skills among blacks. The training of these crafting skills was 
provided by unions which excluded blacks. Weber sued when several slots were 
subsequently awarded to blacks with less seniority as him. The majority of the Court 
concluded that Title VII provides for equality of opportunity, while the minority were of 
the view that it permitted equality of treatment.  
                                                 
286 Section. 24(1) of the EEA. 
287 Section. 24(2) of the EEA. 
288 Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1994) 14 ILJ 1247 (A). 
289 (2008) 12 BLLR 115 (LAC). 
290 Du Toit D ‘et al’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 639. 
291 99 S Ct 2721 (1979); See chapter 3. 
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Although the Court upheld the affirmative action plan, it laid down very clear criteria to 
which future affirmative action plans would be judged, as discussed hereafter. In the 
circumstances it can be assumed that consultation with interested parties would be 
applicable in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of employment equity 
plans in terms of the US equal opportunity clause. The inference to be drawn is that an 
employer, in order to address inequalities in the workplace has the right, after 
consultation to take steps which are necessary and just. 
 
 
4.3.2 Affirmative Action Plans 
 
Employers could comply with the respective legislation and orders, only if they have 
developed a proper affirmative action plan, that it was properly consulted about as 
required by law, as stated above.  This approach was confirmed in the US in United 
States Steelworkers v Weber
292
 in which the Court concluded as follows:  
 
‘First, the legitimate expectations of whites should not be trammelled 
 unnecessarily. No white person could be dismissed in order to be replaced by a  
 black person, and there should not be an absolute bar to the advancement of 
 white employees. Secondly, the plan must be temporary, with either a specified 
 date or goal which would terminate the plan. The plan must only continue for as 
 long as necessary to correct the problem. Thirdly, the plan must be flexible and 
 could not be used to maintain a fixed percentage of minority employees, but only 
 to eliminate ‘manifest racial imbalances’ in a traditionally segregated workforce 
 or job category.’  
 
In terms of the EEA, the same line was followed in Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety 
& Security
293
 in which the Court states,  among other factors, that it was unfair of the SA 
Police Service (SAPS), in the absence of an equity plan, not to appoint white candidates 
to positions reserved for the designated groups.  Section 20(1) of the EEA states:  
 
‘A designated employer must prepare and implement an employment equity plan 
 which will achieve reasonable progress towards employment equity in that 
 employer’s workforce.’  
 
Employers have to ensure that an affirmative action plan must contain ‘numerical goals’ 
to ensure the achievement of equitable representation of people from the designated 
groups.
294
 This plan must also be in accordance with the provisions as contained in s 20 
(2)(a)-(i) of the EEA. In terms of s 20, inter alia, the designated employer must take into 
consideration the objectives for each year and in terms of s 15(2), the employer have to 
ensure the elimination of employment barriers which will adversely affect the progress of 
designated groups. 
 
                                                 
292 99 S Ct 2721 (1979). 
293 (2003) 24 ILJ 163 (LC). 
294 Section 15(2)(d) and s 20(2)(c) of the EEA. 
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In terms of the Namibian legislation, s 23, states that every relevant employer
295
 must 
prepare and implement a three-year affirmative action plan. This plan must contain 
specific affirmative action measures to be implemented to ensure, the elimination of 
employment barriers against persons in the designated groups. Section 18 defines 
designated groups as ‘(a) racially disadvantaged persons; (b) women (inclusive of all 
races); and (c) persons with disabilities (physical or mental limitations, inclusive of all 
races)’. 
 
The term ‘racially disadvantaged persons’ means all persons belonging to a racial or 
ethnical group which formerly had been, or still is, directly or indirectly disadvantaged in 
the sphere of employment as a consequence of social, economic, or educational 
imbalances arising out of racially discriminating laws or practices before the 
independence of Namibia.  In giving effect to this, s 19 of the Act stipulates that a 
relevant employer should give preferential treatment to suitably qualified
296
 persons from 
designated groups. The Act also compels a relevant employer to train a Namibian citizen 
as an understudy for every appointment of a non-Namibian citizen. Given the above, it 
appears that the development and implementation of affirmative action plans are the only 
valid process to ensure the elimination of inequalities in the workplace.  
 
Although affirmative action plans in terms of US legislation, should be of a temporary 
and flexible nature, it is a proven fact that an employer’s action in implementing 
affirmative action measures could only be justified in terms of a proper employment 
equity plan. The inference to be drawn from the discussion above, is, that the objective of 
equity plans are to achieve reasonable progress in the accommodation of people from the 
designated groups, as envisaged by ss 42(b) and 15(c) of the EEA.   
 
 
4.3.3 The Monitoring of the Implementation of Affirmative Action 
 
The EEA provides for employees and trade union representatives to report any deviations 
and / or contraventions of the Act to any person who is party to the agreed affirmative 
action plan.
297
 Labour inspectors, in terms of ss 35 and 36, are also empowered to 
monitor the effective implementation of the provisions of this Act along with the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act. In terms of item 7.1.2 of the Code of Good Practice, that 
managerial accountability for employment equity outcomes should be incorporated in the 
manager’s performance contract.298  
 
 
 
                                                 
295 See chapter 3 par 3.2.2.1. 
296 See chapter 3 par 3.2.2.1.  
297 Section 34 ‘Any employee or trade union representative may bring an alleged contravention of this Act 
      to the attention of- (a) another employee; (b) an employer; (c) a trade union; (d) a workplace forum; 
     (e) a labour inspector; (f) the Director-General; or (g) the Commission.’ 
298 GN R1394 GG 20626 of 23 November 1999. 
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It follows that a designated employer must also assign one or two managers to take 
responsibility for monitoring and implementing the affirmative action measures.
299
 As 
indicated before, this does not relieve the employer of its responsibility in terms of this 
Act or any other law.
300
 These managers are in terms of s 34 of the Act responsible to 
report any contravention to the relevant people mentioned therein. However, it ultimately 
remains the responsibility of the employer to address any shortcomings. In other words as 
soon as the employer become aware of a breach or deviation of the equity plan he or she 
should take remedial steps which are necessary to rectify the situation. 
 
According to the Namibian Act, the review officer has responsibilities similar to those of 
labour inspectors, to evaluate affirmative action plans, including ‘analysing and 
reviewing the affirmative action plan and to ensure that the relevant employers 
implement the plan and comply with the provisions of the Act; and thereafter submit their 
findings and recommendations to the Commission to approve or reject the report. The 
employer will receive a copy of same’. The inference drawn is that an affirmative action 
plan should first be approved by the Commission, before implementation, to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of the Act. 
 
In the US, the Department of Labour is empowered to issue regulations which in turn 
allow federal agencies to impose sanctions and penalties for non-compliance with 
EO’s.301 As stated before, Title VII does not impose a statutory duty on employers to 
implement affirmative action. However, in the event that a person is wronged by an 
unfair labour practice of the employer, the courts have the responsibility to remedy the 
situation. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that legislation directs employers how to 
ensure employment equity in the workplace. It follows then that, employers have a duty 
to ensure compliance of the relevant legislation, to consult with the relevant parties in the 
workplace, developing, implementing and monitoring the effectiveness of affirmative 
action plans. Employers are equally obliged to follow the guidelines as directed by the 
Director-General of Labour in terms of the EEA, the EEC (Namibian) and the OFCCP 
(US). Non-compliance thereof may lead to punitive actions e.g. employers may pay 
penalties or loosing government contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
299 Section 24(1) of the EEA. 
300 Section 24(2) of the EEA. 
301 The role of the Department of Labor with regard to equal employment opportunity is limited. The 
     department liaises the EEOC, OFCCP and other agencies when drafting regulations. They also may 
     prosecute employers who provide false or misleading information to agencies. 
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4.5 Powers of the Director-General of Labour 
 
As stated hereinbefore, in terms of s 42 of the EEA, the Director-General, in determining 
whether a designated employer is implementing employment equity in compliance with 
this Act,  must take into account factors which includes but are not limited to, 
 
 ‘(a) The extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different 
        designated groups are equitably represented within each occupational 
        category and level in that employer’s workforce in relation to the; 
(i)   demographic profile of the national and regional economically active       
   population; 
(ii)  pool of suitably qualified people from designated groups from which the      
  employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint employees; 
(iii) economic and financial factors relevant to the sector in which the 
       employer operates; 
        (iv) present and anticipated economic and financial circumstances of the 
              employer; and 
(v)  the number of present and planned vacancies that exist in the various     
       categories and levels, and the employer’s labour turnover; 
(b)  progress made in implementing employment equity by other designated       
      employers operating under comparable circumstances and within the same 
      sector; 
(c)  reasonable efforts made by a designated employer to implement its 
      employment equity  plan; 
(d) the extent to which the designated employer has made progress in eliminating 
      employment barriers that adversely affect people from the designated groups; 
      and 
(e) any other prescribed factor.’ 
 
It is suggested that not all the criteria stated above might be applicable to every 
designated employer. In other words the Director-General of Labour or his or her 
delegated person should determine which of the provisions are most relevant as key 
indicators of compliance.
302
 It is evident from the above that the Director-General of 
Labour must also determine, among other provisions contained in chapter V of the Act, 
whether an employer has a data-base of ‘suitably qualified’ people (employees) in 
accordance with s 20(3) of the Act. Furthermore, to what extent designated groups are 
accommodated in the workplace, and whether the employer utilized them equitably in the 
different occupational categories in terms of a proper human resource and development 
plan.  
 
It follows that in doing so the Director-General of Labour has to consider whether the 
suitably qualified people deployed in the workplace, are in proportion with the 
demographic profile of the national and regional economically active population. It is 
submitted that in determining the demographic profile, the location of the employer’s 
business would be a determining factor.  
                                                 
302 Du Toit D ‘et al’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 656. 
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That said, s 42(a)(i) is currently the subject of a labour dispute in the Labour Court
303
 as 
employers differ with regard to the interpretation of that provision of the Act. The 
Director-General may also conduct a review meru motu to determine whether an 
employer complies with the provisions of the EEA.
304
 In terms of s 43(2), the Director-
General may embark on several actions to determine the status of compliance by the 
employer.  
 
The Director-General, subsequent to s 43(2), may also in terms of s 44 approve the 
employment equity plan or, decide on steps to be taken to rectify the shortcomings within 
a specific time frame, and or take any other steps deemed necessary. In the event where 
an employer fails to comply with the instructions subsequent to the Director-General’s 
directives issued in terms of ss 43 and 44, the Director-General may refer the employer’s 
failure to the Labour Court.
305
  
 
In other words, the Director-General is not compelled to take court action but can also 
revert to alternative dispute resolution actions. Following a referral to the Labour Court, 
it may, among other orders, issue a compliance order, refer the dispute to the CCMA, 
order compensation in the event an employee was unfairly treated, and / or impose a fine 
with regard to a failure to comply with a specific provision of the Act.
306
  
 
 
4.6 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) 
 
The objective of the PAJA is to give effect to the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Hence the Preamble states: 
 
‘WHEREAS section 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution provides that everyone has 
 the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
 and that everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
 action has the right to be given written reasons; 
 
AND WHEREAS section 33(3) of the Constitution requires national legislation to 
be enacted to give effect to those rights, and to- 
- provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
- impose a duty on the state to give effect to those rights; and 
- promote an efficient administration; 
 
AND WHEREAS item 23 of Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides that the 
national legislation envisaged in section 33 (3) must be enacted within three years 
of the date on which the Constitution took effect; 
 
                                                 
303 Solidarity & Others v Department of Correctional Service & Others (Case No. C368/2012).       
304 Section 43(1) of the EEA. 
305 Section 45 of the EEA.  
306 Section 50 of the EEA. 
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AND IN ORDER TO- 
- promote an efficient administration and good governance; and 
- create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the 
public administration or in the exercise of a public power or the 
performance of a public function, by giving effect to the right to just 
administrative action,..’ 
 
In view of the Preamble, it is safe to deduce that the Constitution serves as the framework 
within which government administrations should execute their authority. This includes, 
among others, the day to day activities of government e.g. actions of ministers, Directors-
General, municipal managers, and other public officials.
307
 
 
It is furthermore envisaged to be an open and transparent process of government to which 
the public has access for recourse should they feeling wronged by an administrative 
decision. In other words, the exercise of public power by officials must comply with the 
provisions of the Constitution which is the supreme law.
308
 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
(1) ‘Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
 procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action 
has the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must- 
(a)  provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and 
(2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration.’ 
 
In accordance with s 33, the PAJA was enacted with the objective to promote an efficient 
administration to ensure a democratic, accountable, open and transparent government for 
all.  
 
Hence, ‘administrative action’ means any decision taken or any failure to take a decision, 
by – 
 
(a) an organ of state, when-  
     (i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; 
          or 
     (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
           legislation.; or 
                                                 
307 Van Heerden M ‘Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000: Three Types of Administrative Actions’ 
      (2009) 184. 
308 The Constitution s 33. 
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(b) a natural or juristic person, other than a organ of state, when exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision..’309 
 
As alluded to before, the term ‘organ of state’ should be understood to mean an organ of 
state that forms part of the executive sphere of government. It follows that the term not 
only refers to an institution, such as a department, but also to an official who is 
empowered by the Constitution, a provincial constitution or any other legislation to 
perform a function.
310
 
 
Accordingly, administrative action refers to actions taken by an organ of state while 
exercising a public power of performing a public function. In instances where an official 
is empowered by legislation to exercise a power or to perform a certain function and such 
official refuses or fails to exercise the power or to perform the function, such refusal or 
failure in itself qualifies as an administrative act.
311
 In essence, the rule of natural justice 
has to be complied with when taking administrative actions. Accordingly, a person, who 
will be affected by the decision, must be afforded the opportunity to state his or her case 
and the authority must consider the merits thereof before taking the decision’.312 It also 
implies that the authority that takes the decision must be free from bias and must be 
unprejudiced.
313
 
 
Having considered the above, it can be concluded that the Director-General of Labour is 
a functionary in terms of the Act. It is also submitted that the functions of the Director-
General of Labour as prescribed in chapter V of the EEA constitute administrative 
actions as defined in s 1 of the Act, and that they are actions on behalf of a state organ. 
Subject to s 56(4) of the EEA, any official of the Department of Labour who performs a 
delegated responsibility is equally subject to the provisions of the PAJA. Any such 
decision taken, which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate 
expectations of a person, should be fair. It follows that a person who feels that their right 
is adversely affected by a decision of the Director-General is entitled to be provided with 
written reasons. 
 
The Constitutional Court in President of the RSA v SARFU
314
 clearly distinguishes 
between government and administration. The Court found that administration is the part 
of government that is responsible for the implementation of legislation. In this case the 
Court makes it plain that to determine whether an action constitutes an administrative 
function in terms of the PAJA, the focus is on the function rather the functionary. 
Therefore, when the Director-General and / or their delegate perform a function in terms 
of the relevant provisions of chapter V, this would undoubtedly constitute an 
administrative action.
315
 
                                                 
309 Section 1 of the PAJA. 
310 The Constitution s 239. 
311 Section 1 of the PAJA. 
312 Section 3(2)(b) of the PAJA. 
313 Section 3(3) of the PAJA.  
314 (1999) 10 (BLCR) 1059 (CC). 
315 Section 1 of the PAJA. 
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4.6.1 Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
 
Any person, whose rights were adversely affected by an administrative action from an 
organ of state, as defined above, may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal 
designed for the judicial review of an administrative action.
316
 A court or tribunal has the 
power to review, among others, an administrative action taken by an administrator who 
was not authorized to do so in terms of the law, if the action was procedurally unfair, for 
ulterior purpose or motive, in bad faith, or arbitrarily or capriciously.  
 
A person who feels wronged can also in terms of the Act take a failure of an 
administrator to act on judicial review.
317
 This can be illustrated at the hand of the 
pending labour court case in which the union, Solidarity obo members of the Department 
of Correctional Services (The Department) sues the Department for an alleged unfair 
labour practice for not applying regional demographics as well.
318
 The Department, in 
developing its equity plan considers only national demographics. In terms of s 42(a)(i), 
an employer have to consider both national and regional demographics as prescribed by 
the EEA. The Department claims that it is in terms of s 7(2)(a) of the Public Service Act 
103 of 1994, a National Department and is entitled to considers only the national 
demographics in developing its equity plan.  
 
As a result coloured employees of the Department in the Western Cape, who are 
members of the (dominant) economical active population felt prejudiced by the decision 
as they are restrained in terms of employment opportunities and promotions. The 
Department’s equity plan supports the views of the former Director-General of Labour, 
Mr Jimmy Manyi who at the time said that coloured people is over populated in the 
Western Cape and should spread out to other provinces for job opportunities.
319
 Hence, 
the coloured members approached the labour court to review the Department’s equity 
plan as it did not take regional demographics into account. 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Given the above, it is submitted, that the successful implementation of affirmative action 
measures are the responsibility of not only the employer but of all role-players concerned. 
However, the employer remains the person ultimately responsible for the non-compliance 
with the provisions of the Act. The effective implementation and monitoring of 
affirmative action plans require a team effort and the major responsibility rests with the 
relevant employer. In essence, all parties whether consulted or not, who are relevant to 
the workplace have a responsibility to ensure the effective execution of the affirmative 
action plan.  
                                                 
316 Section 6 of the PAJA. 
317 Section 6(3) of the PAJA. 
318 Solidarity & Others v Department of Correctional Service & Others (Case No. C368/2012). 
319 Hlongwane S (Analysis): ‘Jimmy Manyi finds out just how tough it is to be between Manuel and  a hard 
     place’ The Daily Maverick  2 March 2011 5  
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They are equally responsible to report any contravention to the Director-General of 
Labour or any other party as stated in s 34. Although managers may be held accountable 
to reach the affirmative action objectives, the employer remains ultimately responsible. 
Therefore, it goes without saying that the success of an affirmative action plan requires 
its collective ownership by those ultimately affected by it.
320
 
 
The Director-General, at the same time, has the responsibility to ensure that employers 
comply effectively with the provisions of the Act, and may institute the necessary 
proceedings to remedy any non-compliance. The Director-General of Labour and / or 
their delegate who performs a function in terms of chapter V of the EEA is bound by the 
provisions of the PAJA. It requires the Director-General of Labour to be transparent, 
accountable, and to ensure the application of a democratic procedure. In other words the 
Director-General of Labour has to comply with the rules of natural justice. 
 
Any person, who feels wronged by an action, or a failure to act by an administrator of an 
organ of state, has the right to seek relief in terms of a judicial review in a court or 
tribunal designated for that purpose. The court or tribunal, after considered the arguments 
of the parties may grant any order that is just and equitable in terms of s 8 of the PAJA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
320 Van Rooyen J ‘Implementing Affirmative Action in Namibia’ 3 ed (2000) 13. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
AN EVALUATION OF WHETHER SECTION 42 OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
EQUITY ACT AND THE POWERS OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF 
LABOUR ARE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF 
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS IN THE WORKPLACE  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It has shown that, due to South Africa’s history of apartheid, certain people were unfairly 
discriminated against on the basis of race, gender and other grounds.
321
 Hence, to 
eradicate unfair discrimination the interim Constitution followed by the final Constitution 
and the EEA were enacted, and had among others, equality as their objective.
322
 The 
objective of the EEA is to ensure that sufficient measures are to be taken to eradicate 
discrimination and ensure equitable representation of members of the designated groups 
in the workplace.  
 
As discussed in the preceding Chapters, the US and Namibia experienced the same 
inequalities and it was therefore important to evaluate and to compare the measures 
implemented by them with those adopted by South Africa. Seeing that South Africa is a 
member of the UN and ILO, it was equally important to determine how its labour laws 
relate to international treaties and conventions.  
 
It follows then, that the purpose of s 42 of the EEA was to ensure that employers comply 
with the aforementioned principles and that the Director-General of Labour has the 
responsibility to assess and enforce compliance therewith. 
 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
The Constitution of the RSA prohibits discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, race 
and gender,
323
 and the EEA in outlawing discrimination echoes this principle. Although 
the Constitution and the EEA legitimizes affirmative action measures to redress the 
inequities of the past, it decline to sanction social engineering mechanically designed to 
produce representation which is solely based on race and gender. This can never be 
justifiable as s 9(2) and (4) of the Constitution and s 2(b) of the EEA, clearly envisage 
representivity that is broad and equitable. Although affirmative action measures are 
directed at the designated groups, s 15(4) prohibits a designated employer from 
embarking on processes which prevent the employment and advancement of non-
designated employees. In other words, opportunities have to be made available to 
employees of all races and gender subject to the provisions of s 42. 
 
                                                 
321 See chapter 1 par 1. 
322 See chapter 1 par 1. 
323 Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
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Section 15(3) of the EEA is relevant in this regard and provides that affirmative action 
plans may include preferential treatment (of designated groups) and numerical goals, but 
exclude quotas.
324
 This principle supports the objective of s 195(1) of the Constitution 
and s 15(2)(b) of the EEA, which clearly envisage representivity that is broad, equitable 
and based on reasonable accommodations being made.
325
  
 
The application of s 42 as it currently stands gave rise to different interpretations e.g. 
national departments of government (Department of Correctional Service and the 
Department of the SA Police Service) claim that they are entitled to implement national 
demographics and in so doing ignore regional demographics despite the preponderance of 
a certain race group in that region.
326
 If this notion is correct, no account is then taken of 
the economically active people in that region which is a requirement in terms of s 
42(a)(i).
327
  
 
Du Toit is of the view that if recruiting is done locally, the regional demographics, and if 
it is done nationally, the national demographics are applicable respectively.
328
 It follows 
then that, in terms of Black individuals (Africans, Coloureds and Indians), the employer 
must take into account the regional and national composition of the black population in 
racial and gender terms.
329
 
 
Section 15(4), read alongside with s 42, as previously stated, prohibits any designated 
employer from establishing employment practices which create an absolute barrier to the 
prospective or continued employment or advancement of people who are not from 
disadvantaged groups. That said, the inference validly to be drawn is that s 15(4) read 
with s 42 did not provide for any existent, or presumed future, barriers (differentiation) 
amongst the designated groups themselves. 
 
In other words, if the enactments prevent employers from creating employment barriers 
for non-designated employees, it would also not tolerate employment barriers created to 
prevent the prospective employment or advancement of members or a certain category of 
members of the designated groups itself, as reflected in the Department of Correctional 
Services EE Plan.
330
 Furthermore, s 42 of the EEA provides for the consideration of 
factors to determine compliance with employment equity concerns. All of these factors, 
including, but not limited to, the demographic profile (national and regional) of the 
economically active population and the pool of suitably qualified people from the 
designated groups, must be taken into account during employment considerations.  
 
 
                                                 
324 Section 15(3) states: “The measures referred to in sub-section (2) (d) include preferential treatment and 
      numerical goals, but exclude quotas.” 
325 See chapter 2 par 2.2. 
326 Dawie-Rubriek ‘DKD is nou op dun ys oor ras.’ Die Burger  25 February 2012 4.  
327 See chapter 2 par 2.9. 
328 Du Toit D ‘et al’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 637. 
329 Du Toit D ‘et al’ ‘Labour Relations Law’ 5 ed (2006) Lexis Nexis 637. 
330 See Chapter 2 par 2.9. 
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It is evident from the above that no basis is provided by the EEA for employment equity 
practices which only consider national demographics to determine an appropriate 
composition of the workplace. However, during a recent urgent court application in the 
Labour Court, the Department of Correctional Services argued that it is compelled to 
apply national equity targets and not the regional equity targets of the Western Cape 
demographics, and that the applicant (a coloured male) who happened to be a member of 
the (dominant) economical active population in the region, should move to another 
province where demographics might favour him.
331
 It is submitted that such application 
of s 42(a)(i) is against the spirit of both the Constitution and the EEA as it presumably 
constitutes a process of social engineering reminiscent of our past (forced removals).  
 
Given the aforegoing, it follows that the Director-General of Labour in terms of s 42 has 
no discretion other to consider both national and regional demographics in determining 
compliance with the EEA. Although the Director-General of Labour is bound to consider 
both, it is suggested that s 42 does not impose a direct legal duty on employers to do the 
same. Thus, it is safe to conclude that, currently, the employer has discretion in applying 
the demographics.
332
  
 
Section 15(2)(d) provides for equitable representation in the various occupational levels 
in the workplace, and it is submitted that the EEA does not provide for ‘degrees of 
disadvantage’ and that no hierarchy for affirmative action exists within the designated 
groups.
333
 It is submitted that such an approach would complicate the objective of the 
EEA as it may be difficult to determine the extent of disadvantage that each person 
individually (African, Coloured and Indian) has suffered, and that the nature of 
discrimination may vary in respect of disability, race and gender.
334
 
  
Chapter V of the EEA gives extensive powers to the Director-General to ensure 
compliance with the EEA. In the event of non-compliance with the Director-General’s 
directives, the Director-General can sue a designated employer in the labour court, 
forcing the employer to comply with the EEA.  Additional to the Director-General’s 
powers, the EEA provides that CCMA commissioners in arbitration proceedings can 
make an appropriate award that gives effect to a provision of the EEA.
335
  
 
However, given the uncertainty with regard to the interpretation of s 42(a)(i), it is 
submitted that the Director-General of Labour, in terms of his or her powers, would be 
unable to direct an employer as to which demographics should be applicable in drafting 
and implementing their affirmative action plan. 
 
 
 
                                                 
331 Jones M ‘Equity Targets – Prisons officer fights for promotion’ Cape Times 22 Augustus 2012 2.   
332 See chapter 2 par 2.2. 
333 See chapter 2 par 2.2. 
334 McGregor M ‘The Application of Affirmative Action in Employment law with specific reference to the 
     Beneficiaries: A Comparative Study’ (unpublished LLD thesis, Unisa, 2005) 443. 
335 Section 48. 
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On consideration of the aforesaid, it appears that s 42 (with the exception of s 42(a)(i)) 
contains sufficient measures to ensure the eradication of past discrimination and to ensure 
equitable representation in the workplace through the selection of suitably qualified 
people from amongst members of the designated groups.  
 
Given the labour dispute with regard to the Department of Correctional Services EE Plan, 
clarity in respect of s 42(a)(i) is critical in ensuring that the drafting of equity plans and 
their implementation pass constitutional muster. Therefore, this highly contentious issue 
should urgently be put to rest in terms of a Constitutional Court judgment to ensure 
guidance and legal certainty. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
In the light of the above and with the exception of s 42(a)(i) as discussed herein, it can be 
concluded that the EEA did contribute significantly to transformation in the workplace in 
terms of equitable representation. However, more needs to be done, and an expectation 
that the workplace will become absolutely discrimination free is misplaced. 
 
Neither would it be possible for equal opportunities to become available overnight for 
everyone. Systemic discrimination in the workplace will continue to persist and will 
obviously be eradicated over a reasonable time. However, given the reported cases which 
were referred to in the preceding chapters, it is evident that affirmative action has become 
an acceptable and legitimate vehicle to ensure equality in the workplace.
336
 
 
It is submitted, that to give legitimate effect to s 42 of the EEA, employers should ensure 
that their equity plans reflect under-representivity in the different categories and levels in 
the workplace. It follows that it would be unnecessary and unfair to have pre-determined 
and arbitrary hierarchies and ranking of the designated groups.
337
 Therefore, it is 
submitted that employers should treat members of the designated groups equally with 
specific reference to ‘Black people” (Africans, Coloureds and Indians), and that merit and 
experience should be the only determining factor amongst them.  
 
Such approach will embrace the objectives of international instruments in that human 
beings are ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’.338 It is further submitted that 
differentiation amongst the designated groups (Black people) would be counter-
productive to the objectives of the EEA. The fact that a certain category of the designated 
groups had to approach the Labour Court to ensure equal treatment, has the potential to 
create a culture of racial inferiority which may evolve into racial hostility amongst 
them.
339
 
 
 
                                                 
336 See chapter  2 par 2.2 and par 2.4. 
337 Solidarity & Others v Department of Correctional Service & Others (Case No.C368/2012). 
338 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted on 16 December 1948. 
339 Rubenfeld J ‘Affirmative Action’ (1997) 427. 
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It is also submitted that the powers vested in the Director-General in terms of chapter V, 
with the exception of s 42(a)(i), is sufficient to ensure compliance with the EEA. The 
Director-General of Labour in its oversight capacity, can apply measures to assist, direct, 
and can as a last resort, in the case of non-compliance with its directives sue, the 
employer in the Labour Court.
340
  
 
Finally, it goes without saying that affirmative action has the potential to evoke 
unrealistic expectations and emotions as it restrict opportunities for some. As a result, 
negativism will be detrimental to the long-term success of affirmative action. Therefore, 
as prerequisite, affirmative action policies, requires the recognition by all role-players, 
and should be perceived to be fair and reasonable by both employers and employees. 
 
 
5.4 Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that South Africa consider the Namibian Affirmative Action Act as it 
is plausible in the sense that the benefits of the affirmative action are based on whether or 
not an individual has suffered from past discrimination, and that race is not the 
determining factor.
341
 However, proof of direct or indirect disadvantage in the labour 
field as a result of the social, educational and economical status arising from past 
discrimination is required.
 342
 
 
It is submitted that this approach would in all likelihood contribute to the following, e.g. 
 
- First, prevent a further differentiation amongst the designated groups, a situation 
created by the Department of Correctional Services as discussed above. 
- Secondly, prevent that the same people in the designated groups benefit more than 
once (including BEE contracts), ensuring that the benefit of affirmative action 
reaches more disadvantaged persons. (The EEA provides no guidelines as to when 
a designated person is sufficiently advanced. The implication is that a designated 
person enjoys affirmative action benefits, and a non-designated person, will be 
excluded of equal job opportunities for the duration of his or her lifetime), and  
- Thirdly, prevent that the workplace loses essential / scare skills by appointing a 
non-designated person (skilled) together with a designated person (trainee) with 
specific performance outcomes (mentorship).  
 
 
 
                                                 
340  Section 45 of the EEA. 
341  See chapter 3 par 3.5.3(b). 
342 Namibian Act s 18 states: ‘(1) For the purpose of this Act there are three designated groups 
       whose members are to be benefit by the implementation of affirmative action measures: (a) 
       racially disadvantaged persons; (b) women; and persons with disabilities. (2) (a)“racially 
       disadvantaged persons” means all persons who belong to a racial or ethnic group which was or is, 
       directly or indirectly, disadvantaged in the labour field as  a consequence of social, economic, or 
       educational imbalances arising out of racially discriminatory laws or  practices before the 
       Independence of Namibia;..’ 
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The aforesaid would in all probability prevent a situation of labour practices which can 
result in un-intended consequences of affirmative action measures (the one race group 
feel threatened by another). It has also the potential of promoting a spirit of unity and 
racial harmony amongst racial groups, in that everybody will be afforded a fair 
opportunity in the workplace.   
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